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ABSTRACT 
Today’s most efficient and widely used cryptographic 
standards such as RSA rely on the difficulty of factoring 
large numbers to resist cryptanalysis.  Asymmetric 
cryptography is used in a plethora of sensitive operations 
from online bank transactions to international e-commerce, 
and the Department of Defense also uses asymmetric 
cryptography to transmit sensitive data. Quantum computers 
have the potential to render obsolete widely deployed 
asymmetric ciphers essential to the secure transfer of 
information. Despite this, alternatives are not in place. 
The goal of this study is to understand the 
alternatives to classical asymmetric cryptography that can 
be used as substitutes should quantum computers be 
realized.  This study explores quantum-resistant 
alternatives to traditional ciphers and involves 
experimenting with available implementations of ciphers 
described the post-quantum literature as well as developing 
our own implementations based on descriptions of algorithms 
in the literature.  This study provides an original 
implementation of hash-based digital signature and detailed 
instructions on its use as well as customization of the 
NTRU lattice-based cryptography suite, including the use of 
NTRU and AES together in a hybrid cryptographic protocol.  
This thesis will make recommendations on future work 
necessary to prepare for the emergence of large-scale, 
fault-tolerant quantum computers. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Today’s most efficient and widely used cryptographic 
standards such as RSA rely on the difficulty of factoring 
to resist cryptanalysis. Asymmetric cryptography is used in 
a plethora of sensitive operations from online bank 
transactions to international e-commerce, and the 
Department of Defense also uses asymmetric cryptology to 
transmit sensitive data. 
Quantum computers have the potential to render 
obsolete widely deployed asymmetric ciphers essential to 
the secure transfer of information.  Despite this, 
alternatives are not in place. 
This thesis recommends that the rest of the industry 
follow the lead of the Accredited Standards Committee X9 
Incorporated, Financial Industry Standards, and identify a 
suitable alternative cipher such as the NTRUEncrypt 
Cryptosystem as the primary algorithm for asymmetric 
cryptography to replace RSA if needed. Preparations should 
be made now to facilitate a smooth transition.  If the 
concern is too great that NTRU is a new algorithm, then 
this thesis at least recommends that it be added to the 
published standards as an alternative cipher implementation 
so that it is available to the industry in the event 
quantum computers abruptly come into existence. 
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I. PROBLEM INTRODUCTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s most widely used asymmetric ciphers such as 
RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Aldeman) rely on the difficulty of 
factoring large numbers as the mathematical basis of their 
resistance to cryptanalysis.  Asymmetric cryptography is 
used in a plethora of sensitive operations from online bank 
transactions to international e-commerce, and the 
Department of Defense also uses asymmetric cryptography to 
transmit sensitive data. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers have the 
potential to render obsolete traditional asymmetric ciphers 
essential to the secure transfer of information. Despite 
this, alternatives are not in place. 
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The intent of this two-phase, sequential mixed methods 
study is to understand the alternatives to traditional 
asymmetric cryptography that can be used to protect 
information in the event that large-scale, fault-tolerant 
quantum computers capable of factoring large integers are 
realized.  The first phase is a qualitative exploration of 
quantum-resistant ciphers that satisfy the requirements for 
secure communication presently fulfilled by traditional 
asymmetric ciphers like RSA.  The first phase also explores 
their tradeoffs in comparison to traditional methods. This 
phase of the study also involves reading published academic 
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articles in the emerging field of post-quantum 
cryptography.  The second phase of the study involves 
experimenting with available implementations of quantum-
resistant ciphers described in the post-quantum literature.  
This phase involves compiling and executing the downloaded 
programs and measuring the performance of encryption and 
decryption.  For ciphers that have no available 
implementation, this phase also involves developing 
original implementations of post-quantum ciphers described 
in the literature. This thesis will then form conclusions 
about the impact of deploying an alternative encryption 
infrastructure based on post-quantum ciphers.  This thesis 
will make recommendations on future work necessary to 
improve the performance of these alternative ciphers and 
lessen the impact of the sudden emergence of large-scale, 
fault-tolerant quantum computers. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Research Questions 
What if quantum computing reduces the time to defeat 
traditional ciphers from millions of years by today’s 
supercomputers to only seconds?  What if we are already 
living in that era and unfriendly forces have such 
technology? 
How efficient are post-quantum ciphers proposed as 
alternatives to traditional ciphers like RSA and Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC)?  Do these ciphers have enough 
bandwidth to meet today's cryptographic workloads?  What is 
the performance impact of deploying an alternative 
cryptographic infrastructure based on post-quantum ciphers?   
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Could available implementations be used as a basis for 
constructing a cryptographic software library that is a 
viable alternative to classical ciphers? 
2. Hypothesis 
While alternative ciphers exist, available 
implementations do not satisfy all performance requirements 
of modern cryptographic workloads.  A cryptographic 
infrastructure that allows for ciphers to be reconfigured 
dynamically will reduce the costs of switching 
cryptographic infrastructure quickly in response to the 
development of quantum computers. 
E. RESEARCH METHOD 
Since the first phase this mixed methods study 
involves qualitative analysis, this thesis begins with an 
analysis of published literature on quantum-resistant 
ciphers.  This qualitative study also analyzes the 
tradeoffs of a dynamically reconfigurable cryptographic 
infrastructure that can rapidly deploy an updated cipher in 
the event that quantum computers compromise the strength of 
widely used, traditional asymmetric ciphers.  The second 
phase of this study involves the engineering of original 
implementations of post-quantum ciphers described in the 
literature, detailed instructions on their use, and 
quantitative analysis of their performance.  This phase 
also involves analysis of available implementations, 
demonstrating how to customize them to a particular 
purpose, and analyze their performance.  The qualitative 
phase identifies the ciphers and implementations to be 
explored in the quantitative phase. 
 4 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 5 
II. QUANTUM COMPUTING 
A. QUANTUM COMPUTING 
1. Introduction 
Quantum computers harness the laws of quantum physics, 
i.e., the unusual properties of matter at tiny scales to 
achieve performance advantages over classical computers.  
Although rudimentary quantum computers have been built, 
they small error-prone, limited to solving small problems, 
such as factoring the integer 15 into its prime factors of 
3 and 5.  While much progress has been made in the physical 
implementation of quantum bits and gates in a variety of 
technologies as well as the development of quantum 
algorithms and quantum error correction schemes, much work 
remains to fulfill the vision of large-scale, fault-
tolerant quantum computers.  These challenges include 
increasing the reliability of physical implementations and 
lowering their cost.  
Within the field of quantum information processing, an 
important distinction exists between quantum computing, a 
technology currently in its infancy, and quantum key 
distribution, a relatively mature technology with 
commercial implementations available.  Both topics will be 
discussed below in greater detail, but this thesis will 
focus on the impact quantum computers are predicted to have 
on asymmetric cryptography.  Quantum computing is an 
active, interdisciplinary field motivated by the promise of 
vastly outperforming classical computers on certain 
problems (Perry, 2006).  One such problem is the factoring 
of integers, which has significant implications for 
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information assurance because large numbers of online 
banking transactions use asymmetric ciphers that rely in 
the difficulty of factoring to resist cryptanalysis. 
2. Digital Bit Verses Quantum Bit 
Quantum computers are similar to classical computers.  
Today’s classical computers operate on binary digits, or 
bits, that can represent either 0 or 1.  In a classical 
computer, operations are performed sequentially on these 
bits as dictated by the algorithm.  Quantum computers use 
“qubits,” or quantum bits.  Qubits also may take on a 
definite value of 0 or 1, but they also can be placed in a 
“superposition” state in which there is a certain 
probability of measuring a 0 and a certain probability of 
measuring a 1.  Once the measurement is taken, the qubit 
takes on the definite value measured.  For example, in an 
equal superposition of 0 and 1, there is a 50 percent 
chance of measuring a 0 and a 50 percent chance of 
measuring a 1.  This particular superposition can 
simultaneously represent both 0 and 1.  A quantum 
computer’s processing power grows exponentially because 
with every added qubit the number of values represented by 
the quantum register doubles.  For example, two quantum 
bits in superposition can represent four values (0, 1, 2, 
and 3).  Unlike classical computers, a single quantum gate 
applied to n qubits, all of which are in an equal 
superposition of 0 and 1, can manipulate all 2^n values 
between 0 and 2^n – 1 simultaneously.  A 250-qubit register 
can represent more numbers simultaneously (using quantum 
superposition) than there are atoms in the observable 
universe. (Perry, 2006) 
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3. Quantum Entanglement 
Quantum computers also exploit quantum entanglement.  
Measurement of one half of a pair of entangled particles 
causes the other half of the pair to take on a definite 
value that is correlated with the first particle measured.  
This phenomenon is counterintuitive, and Albert Einstein 
called quantum entanglement “spooky action at a distance.”  
Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen tried to 
prove that one particle could not affect the other particle 
because of physical separation, but their study resulted in 
the now famous EPR paradox (Einstein, Boris, Podolsky 
paradox) that established that measurement of the first 
particle causes the second particle to take on a definite 
state that is correlated to the first.  Furthermore, this 
effect is instantaneous, which makes it faster than the 
speed of light.  Peter Shor determined how to harness 
entanglement and superposition to develop an algorithm for 
calculating discrete logarithms and the prime factors of an 
integer.  Shor’s algorithm can factor integers in 
polynomial time; the fastest known classical algorithm 
requires exponential time.  If a quantum computer that can 
factor large integers is built, it could defeat asymmetric 
encryption schemes such as RSA and Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography, whose strength against cryptanalysis is based 
on the difficulty of factoring integers. 
B. HOW IT WORKS (BLACK BOX) 
1. Schrodinger’s Cat Theory 
A famous thought experiment for explaining the 
counterintuitive nature of quantum superposition is 
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described in “The Code Book,” by Simon Singh. Erwin 
Schrodinger, a Nobel Prize winner for physics in 1933, 
described a hypothetical scenario in which a cat is placed 
in an opaque box with a vial of a toxic substance that can 
be broken by a hammer, releasing the toxic substance, and 
killing the cat.  The hammer is activated by a 
probabilistic event: a radioactive substance may or may not 
decay within a certain period of time.  A sensor detects 
whether or not the decay occurred; each outcome is equally 
likely.  If the sensor detects that decay has occurred, a 
hammer driven by a motor breaks the vial of poison.  At the 
end of this period of time, the cat could be thought of as 
both dead and alive because we cannot see inside the box.  
Clearly, this thought experiment is absurd since a cat is a 
macroscopic animal much too large to exhibit quantum 
phenomena, but the contraption magnifies the quantum effect 
of radioactive decay, which involves tiny particles, to the 
macroscopic scale of an animal through the mechanism of a 
hammer activated by the decay of the radioactive substance.  
2. Multiverse Theory 
Schrodinger’s thought experiment was intended as a 
critique of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics; the other interpretation of quantum mechanics is 
the multiverse theory.  This theory states that at every 
decision, the universe splits into multiple copies; the 
number of copies is equal to the number of decisions at the 
junction.  This theory also states that these universes are 
connected somehow.  Therefore, photons passing through 
these multiverses interfere with each other, allowing one 
photon to be in all possible states at once. 
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C. QUANTUM COMPUTING VS. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION 
1. Theory Verses Proven Protocol 
Sometimes people confuse quantum computing and quantum 
key distribution.  While quantum computing is in its 
infancy, quantum key distribution is a relatively mature 
technology that has already been commercialized. 
2. Quantum Key Distribution 
 
Figure 1.   Structure of a Quantum Key Distribution link 
(From: SECOQC January 2007) 
Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard invented quantum 
key distribution in 1984.  Quantum key distribution is used 
when two users want create a secure channel for electronic 
transmission of private information.  Quantum key 
distribution is a method of exchanging a symmetric key for 
use with a classical cryptosystem.  What is unique about 
quantum key distribution is that a malicious eavesdropper 
(also known as Eve) cannot eavesdrop on a quantum key 
exchange between two parties (also known as Alice and Bob) 
without detection. 
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Alice sends Bob a random element from a set of four 
polarized photons.  For each photon, Bob then decides at 
random which canonical base to use during measurement: he 
chooses either the horizontal/vertical or the left/right-
circular canonical base.  There is also a 45/135-degree 
canonical base, but this base is used only by Eve and will 
therefore not be discussed.  Bob then communicates to Alice 
over a classical channel the sequence bases he used to 
measure, and Alice tells him whether any of his decisions 
were incorrect.  Alice and Bob then discard all of the bits 
that were measured with the incorrect canonical base and 
all bits Bob failed to receive.  For all horizontal or 
left-circular photons, a value of 0 is registered, and for 
all vertical or right-circular photons, a value of 1 is 
registered.  This series of bits can then be used as a 
secret key to share information as long as they determine 
that Eve has not been listening to their channel.  This 
string of bits is known as the “raw quantum transmission.” 
(Bennet, Bessete, Brassard, Salvail, Smolin, 1991) 
In order for Eve to successfully eavesdrop on a 
quantum key distribution channel without being detected, 
assuming Eve has unlimited resources, Eve must be able to 
intercept and resend, or split photons sent from Alice to 
Bob.  If Eve attempts to intercept and resend photons, it 
is extremely hard for Eve to intercept a photon, decide the 
correct polarization to read, read the photon, and send a 
new photon with the same polarity read by Eve with the 
correct amount of photon intensity to enable Bob’s 
detectors to read Eve’s new photon.  To illustrate how hard 
it would be for Eve to intercept and retransmit a photon, 
recall that a photon can be polarized in three canonical 
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bases or pairs.  Therefore, Eve has four options from which 
to choose, giving Eve at best a 75 percent probability of 
sending the correct photon down the channel without being 
detected at a transmission rate between 1 and 10 kilobits 
per second. (Alleaume, 2007) In order to detect whether or 
not Eve has been listening, Bob must confirm a series of 
randomly selected measurement readings with Alice over the 
unsecure line.  For example, if Alice confirmed the correct 
canonical base to measure as being either horizontal or 
vertical, Bob would then tell Alice he measured horizontal.  
Alice would then confirm he had the correct or incorrect 
measurement, and they both would then discard that bit from 
their key.  If enough correct measurements were made in the 
absence of false measurements to Alice and Bob’s 
satisfaction, they would determine that the key is secure 
and use it for transmitting their secret data.  In 
contrast, if too many errors were detected, they would 
assume the Eve was eavesdropping and start the process over 
again.  Eve could also perform a photon splitting attack, 
but the technical details of this attack are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
The quantum key distribution methodology mentioned 
above is a very basic system.  Alice and Bob could secure 
the classical communication line using previously exchanged 
secure keys via quantum key distribution.  Therefore, every 
new successfully established key created by quantum key 
distribution could be added to a database of secure keys. 
(Bennet, Bessete, Brassard, Salvail, Smolin, 1991) 
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D. CAPABILITY/LIMITATIONS OF QUANTUM COMPUTING 
1. One Will Not Completely Replace the Other 
Although quantum computers have the potential to 
dramatically outperform classical computers, they will only 
do so for a few applications such as Shor’s Algorithm, 
Grover’s Algorithm, and the simulation of quantum physics.  
The successful construction of working quantum computers 
also has the potential to experimentally validate quantum 
theory.  The ability to efficiently factor large integers 
makes asymmetric ciphers such as RSA vulnerable to quantum 
computers. (Nielson, M. A. & Chuang, I. L. 2002)  
Therefore, Quantum computers will not replace classical 
computers except for certain problems.  To give the reader 
an idea of how much processing power quantum computers will 
have for their specific uses, it is important to understand 
that a register of 250 qubits (all in superposition) can 
represent more numbers than there are atoms in the 
universe. (Deutsch, D. & Ekert, A. 1998) Classical 
computers available today have processors with transistor 
counts approaching one billion and (DRAM) memories on the 
order of gigabytes. 
2. Secure Online Transaction Protocols Cracked 
Large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers will 
make any application that uses some of the most common 
cryptographic applications for online secure transactions 
vulnerable.  For example, online banking and shopping or 
any online secure transactions that use Secure Socket 
Layer, the key-lock many people look to see is active  
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before proceeding with their online transaction, will be 
compromised if measures are not put in place before quantum 
computers are realized. 
E. WHERE WE ARE TODAY WITH QUANTUM COMPUTING 
1. Quantum Discrete Log and Factoring, 1994 
In November 1994, the Foundations of Computer Science 
published Peter W. Shor’s “Quantum Computation: Discrete 
Log and Factoring” research paper at their 35th annual 
symposium.  This paper demonstrates how quantum computers 
can take discrete logarithms and factoring problems that 
become exponentially harder on classical computers as the 
numbers become larger, and reduce the computational time 
down to polynomial time on quantum computers (e.g., going 
from 1,000,000 years of computation down to 1 month). 
2. Quantum Mechanics Help in Searching, 1997 
Building on Shor’s algorithm, Lov K. Grover in 1997 
published his research paper, “Quantum Mechanics help in 
searching for a needle in a haystack.”  This paper outlined 
how quantum mechanics can speed up different search 
applications over unsorted data in contrast to classical 
computers.  This algorithm has several useful applications 
including boolean satisfiability, classical random walk 
(i.e., diffusion), and signal processing. 
3. Realization of Shor’s Algorithm, 2001 
In December 2001, Isaac L. Chuang et al. published 
their findings from their implementation of a seven-qubit 
quantum computer that could factor 15 into its prime  
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factors.  The paper is titled “Experimental realization of 
Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm using nuclear magnetic 
resonance.” 
4. Scalable Quantum Logic Array, 2005 
In September 2005, Tzvetan S. Metodi et al. published 
“A Quantum Logic Array Microarchitecture: Scalable Quantum 
Data Movement and Computation.”  This proposes a quantum 
logic array architecture for building fault-tolerant and 
scalable quantum computers. Metodi et al. apply concepts 
from classical computer architecture to the design of 
large-scale quantum computers, which will require millions 
of quantum bits and gates. 
5. Quantum Threshold Theorem 
An important factor limiting the scalability of 
quantum computers is explained by the Quantum Threshold 
Theorem.  In June 1999, Dorit Aharonov and Michael Ben-Or 
published “Fault-Tolerant Quantum Computation with Constant 
Error Rate.”  This paper states that Shor’s assumption that 
the probability for an error in a qubit or gate decays with 
the size of the computation is physically unreasonable.  
Aharonov and Ben-or show that once a specific error rate 
threshold is met, quantum computers will have overcome all 
the physical limitations preventing the realization of 
quantum computers.  They also state, “the point at which 
the physical data meets the theoretical threshold is where 
the quantum computation becomes practical.”  However, no 
team has yet built a physical implementation of a quantum 
bit or a set of universal quantum gates that satisfy the 
minimum reliability requirements of the threshold theorem.  
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Essentially, the threshold theorem states that physical 
implementations must reach a minimum threshold of 
reliability before quantum error correction schemes can be 
effective and practical.  One cannot simply use unreliable 
quantum bits that do not meet the threshold and then apply 
to them aggressive quantum error correction to compensate 
for an unreliable technology. 
F. IF QUANTUM COMPUTING FOLLOWS MOORE’S LAW 
1. Classical Moore’s Law 
Today’s computers have followed closely, but not 
exactly, a statement made by Gordon E. Moore back in the 
1970’s that the number of transistors that can be placed on 
a fixed piece of silicon doubles about every 18 months.  
Therefore, given a fixed CPU size, the computing power 
would theoretically double every 18 months because the 
processor would have twice the number of transistors.  The 
diagram (Figure 2) shows the transistor density of various 
processors over time. 
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Figure 2.   Microprocessor Transistor Counts—Moore's Law 
(From:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Transistor
_Count_and_Moore%27s_Law_-_2011.svg)  
2. Quantum Moore’s Law 
Assume for a moment that quantum computers will follow 
Moore’s Law in a similar manner.  Specifically, assume that 
the sizes of the qubit register will double every 18 
months.  Figure 3 shows how much processing power quantum 
computers would have in relation to classical computers if 
the qubit register were to double every 18 months. 
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Figure 3.   Qubits vs. Classical Transistor Equivalents 
Keep in mind that a typical classical CPU contains on 
the order of one billion transistors. Figure 3 assumes that 
the first quantum computer that achieves the requirements 
as laid out in the Quantum Threshold Theorem has a register 
of 16 qubits, and the figure also assumes that the size of 
the qubit register will double every 18 months as per 
Moore’s Law.  Therefore, if the first quantum computer 
register has 16 qubits, after the first iteration of 
Moore’s Law, quantum computers would have the processing 
power equivalent to a 4.3 terahertz computer, and the 
processing power would continue to grow exponentially.  
Recall from the discussion above that a 250-qubit register 
could hold more numbers in superposition then there are 
atoms in the universe.  It is estimated that there are 
10^80 atoms in the known universe, and Figure 3 shows that 
after 4.5 years, if quantum computing follows Moore’s Law, 
we will have computers that can hold more numbers in 
superposition then there are atoms in the universe. 
The problem with the above argument is that it ignores 
the cost of quantum error correction, which is significant.  
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Designing an effective large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum 
computer architecture requires balancing the gains of 
quantum parallelism against the costs of quantum error 
correction.  In a “winning” design, the gains of 
parallelism exceed the costs of error correction by a big 
enough margin to make the whole enterprise worthwhile. 
Indeed, if quantum error correction were not necessary, 
then a 250-qubit register could hold in superposition more 
states than there are atoms in the universe.  Similarly, to 
factor an n-bit number would require on the order of n 
quantum bits.  However, it is speculated that to factor a 
number on the order of a thousand bits will require on the 
order of a million quantum bits and a million quantum 
gates.  This increase is the cost imposed by quantum error 
correction, which requires additional (redundant) quantum 
bits and gates. 
The above argument also ignores the fact that it is 
unknown whether progress in physical implementations of 
quantum computers will follow Moore’s Law.  …we shall see. 
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III. POST QUANTUM CRYPTOLOGY 
A. CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 
1. Cryptography 
Originating from the Greek words “kryptos” and 
“graphia” meaning “hidden” and “writing” respectively, the 
science of keeping messages secret through encryption and 
decryption is cryptography.  Today we use different forms 
of cryptography to prohibit data from being read by 
unauthorized users, and to prohibit data from being changed 
unintentionally or maliciously.  The majority of 
cryptographic algorithms can be categorized into either 
symmetric or asymmetric cryptography.  There are also one-
way hash functions, which act like a fingerprint of the 
message. Cryptographic hash functions can be used to 
protect data integrity, but they are not used to encode and 
decode data. Hash functions are “one-way” in that given the 
output of the hash function, which is referred to as the 
hash digest; it is very hard for an adversary to determine 
the original message that was the input to the hash 
function.  Together with symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptography, one-way hash functions can be used to provide 
confidentiality and integrity; availability is the third 
aspect of data protection.  This chapter will describe the 
uses of cryptographic primitives and the hard mathematical 
problem on which their strength is based.  This chapter 
will also describe which cryptographic algorithms are 
suspected to be vulnerable to large-scale, fault-tolerant 
quantum computers and which algorithms are believed to be 
quantum computing resistant and why. 
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2. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
Before we get into the different forms of 
cryptography, we first describe the fundamental facets of 
data protection referred to as the “CIA Triad.” The CIA 
Triad covers data Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability.  The Committee on National Security Systems 
defines confidentiality as assurance that information is 
not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, processes, or 
devices; integrity is a condition existing when data is 
unchanged from its source and has not been accidentally or 
maliciously modified, altered or destroyed; and 
availability is the timely and reliable access to data and 
information services for authorized users (CNSS Instruction 
No. 4009, 2010).  For the rest of this thesis, we will 
refer to the CIA Triad when discussing the protection of 
data.  In this thesis, we will consider cryptology to be 
useful for providing data confidentiality and integrity but 
not availability. 
3. Symmetric Cryptography 
Symmetric cryptography, also known as secret-key 
cryptography, uses the same key for encryption and 
decryption.  First, each user must agree to the secret key 
and find a secure location to discuss and share the key 
upon which they agree.  It is important to note that each 
user that is going to participate in the secure 
communication must also be provided the key in a secure 
manner (e.g., if there are 100 different sites that are 
going to participate in a secure video teleconference using 
only symmetric cryptography, each of the 100 sites must be 
provided the secret key securely in advance, and this could 
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be a logistical problem depending on the locations of each 
site and depending on time constraints).  This example 
illustrates a problem known as the key distribution 
problem. Once the key is distributed, then each site can 
use the secret key to encrypt outbound or decrypt inbound 
data. In general, symmetric cryptography is faster than 
asymmetric cryptography.  Depending on the implementation, 
symmetric cryptography is on the order of 1,000 to 10,000 
times faster than asymmetric cryptography. 
4. Asymmetric Cryptography 
Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public-key 
cryptography, helps to address symmetric cryptography’s key 
distribution problem.  Asymmetric cryptography can be used 
to send a file in a secure manner to a recipient that the 
sender has never met.  The sender encrypts the message with 
the receiver’s public key, and the receiver decrypts the 
message with his or her private key.  Only the receiver 
knows the private key; therefore, only the receiver can 
read the message. This protects the confidentiality of the 
message during transmission from sender to receiver. 
Asymmetric cryptography can also be used to support 
digital signatures.  The sender computes the hash of a file 
and encrypts the hash with the sender’s private key.  
Anyone can decrypt the hash value by using the sender’s 
public key.  The receiver computes the hash of the received 
file and compares this to the received hash digest once it 
has been decrypted with the sender’s public key.  This 
helps to ensure the integrity of the message during  
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transmission from sender to receiver.  Only the sender 
could have sent the message because the sender’s private 
key was used to encrypt the hash value. 
To protect both confidentiality and integrity, the 
message can be encrypted with a one-time symmetric session 
key, which the sender encrypts with the receiver’s public 
key.  This is done in conjunction with a digital signature 
where the hash of the message is encrypted with the 
sender’s private key.  The reason for using public-key 
cryptography to exchange a symmetric session-key is that 
symmetric ciphers are faster than asymmetric ciphers, in 
general.  If the same two devices wanted to create another 
secure communication channel after the termination of their 
previous session, they would exchange a new session key. 
If you are a security manager and the security policy 
for your company requires the use of asymmetric 
cryptography, your security system must be capable of using 
digital certificates.  These digital certificates are 
issued by a certificate authority, which digitally signs a 
message containing an identity and a public key in order to 
cryptographically bind them.  Since the message is signed 
with the certificate authority’s private key, anyone can 
verify the signature with the certificate authority’s 
public key.  Digital certificates make it possible to trust 
that Alice’s public key really belongs to Alice and not to 
an imposter.  If an imposter were to hack Alice’s website 
and replace Alice’s public key with the imposter’s public 
key, then someone might inadvertently send Alice a 
sensitive message encrypted with the imposter’s public key 
rather than Alice’s public key.  However, the imposter will 
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not be able to carry out this attack if Alice has a digital 
certificate, because the sender of the sensitive message 
can verify Alice’s digital certificate prior to sending the 
message.  Verification of the imposter’s public key will be 
unsuccessful. 
5. Cryptographic Hash Functions 
Cryptographic Hash Functions are used to create a 
message digest, or fingerprint, of the original message.  
If Alice were to send an unclassified message, but wanted 
to ensure that message integrity was maintained or that it 
was not tampered with in transit to Bob, she could create a 
digital signature of the message using a one-way hash 
function.  Alice then takes the fingerprint and encrypts it 
with her private-key and sends Bob an email that contains 
the original message, the encrypted fingerprint, and her 
public-key.  Bob then receives the message, runs the 
original message through the same cryptographic hash 
algorithm Alice used, and then decrypts the fingerprint 
with Alice’s public-key that was encrypted with Alice's 
private-key.  Finally, Bob compares the fingerprint Alice 
sent against the fingerprint he computed.  If the hash 
values are equal, Bob knows that the message Alice sent was 
not tampered with while in transit. 
Cryptographic hash functions differ from public-key 
and secret-key cryptography because asymmetric and 
symmetric cryptography are used to encrypt and decrypt data 
(i.e., encrypting and then decrypting a message results in 
the original message), whereas cryptographic hash functions 
are one-way functions.  It is extremely difficult to 
determine the input to a hash function given only the hash 
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digest.  The size of the hash digest depends on the 
algorithm.  For example, some of the most common hash 
algorithms are the Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) SHA-256, 
SHA-384, and SHA-512, each algorithm outputting a digest of 
256, 384, and 512 bits respectively regardless of the input 
size. In order for a cryptographic hash function to be 
considered secure, the hash function must be able to input 
any amount of data; output a (normally) smaller fixed-
length digest defined by the algorithm; be fast to compute; 
be hard to invert; and be designed so that it is very 
difficult for an adversary to find collisions.  A hash 
collision occurs whenever two inputs produce the same 
output.  Finding a collision is impossible, but it must be 
very difficult for the adversary to do.  Among the most 
popular hash algorithms is MD5 (Message Digest 5), which 
has the smallest hash output of 120 bits, and as of 2003, 
no collisions had been discovered (Thorsteinson, P., 
Ganesh, G.G., 2003).  However, MD5 is currently considered 
“broken,” as it is now possible to find a collision in less 
than O(2^N) steps.  Another required characteristic of a 
cryptographic hash function is called the avalanche effect, 
i.e., a small change to the input results in a very large 
change to the input. 
To illustrate the avalanche effect, consider the DNA 
of identical twins.  Even if their genomes only differ by a 
single nucleotide, the cryptographic hashes of the digital 
representation of their respective genomes will be 
completely different.  To illustrate the one-way property 
of a hash-function, consider literature as an example.  
Given a 256-bit hash digest of Shakespeare’s play, Romeo 
and Juliet, to reverse the one-way property would require 
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the adversary to generate the entire play from only 256-bit 
digest.  Assuming a 96-character alphabet and given that 
the play is 138,386 characters long, the adversary would 
have to perform O(96^138386) hash computations before 
finding the string of characters that correspond to the 
play Romeo and Juliet. 
B. CIPHERS BELIEVED TO BE VULNERABLE TO QUANTUM COMPUTING 
1. Quantum Computing Capability Review 
This section will discuss algorithms believed to be 
vulnerable to quantum computers.  Each of these algorithms 
relies on the difficulty of factoring large numbers or 
computing discrete logarithms as the basis for their 
security because these are difficult problems for classical 
computers to solve in polynomial time.  Recall that Shor's 
algorithm used in conjunction with quantum computers will 
make algorithms that rely on the difficulty of factoring or 
computing discrete logarithms vulnerable.  The ciphers 
presented in Section 'C' do not rely on the difficulty of 
factoring or of computing discrete logarithms.  Their 
strength lies in the difficulty of solving different hard 
mathematical problems.  Since quantum algorithms do not 
exist for these problems, these ciphers are believed to be 
quantum computing resistant. 
2. Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) 
Building on the Diffie and Hellman “Public-key 
Cryptosystem,” Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman 
created the RSA cipher in 1978 to ensure that the 
properties of the “paper mail system” were preserved in the 
email era; specifically, that the mail remained 
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confidential and could be signed. (Rivest, R.L., Shamir, 
A., Adleman, L., 1978)  Both RSA and the Diffie-Hellman 
algorithms provide key exchange, but RSA added public key 
encryption, making RSA more versatile. (Schmeh, K.)  Today, 
the RSA cipher is the most common form of public-key 
cryptology in use.  After licensing a patent from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the RSA cipher was 
offered as a commercial product in 1982. (Russell, D., 
Gangemi, G.T., 1991) 
The strength of the RSA cipher relies on the 
difficulty of factoring large numbers.  The minimum 
recommended key length for RSA is 1024-bits until they year 
2015; then 2048-bits will be recommended until the year 
2030. (www.rsa.com) 
3. Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) 
Based on the difficulty of solving the discrete 
logarithm problem, the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is 
used to electronically sign digital messages.  The DSA is a 
standard specified by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology and was issued in May 1994.  The three 
functions of the DSA are to generate a key used to “sign” 
the message, sign the document, and verify the signature on 
the other end. (FIPS PUB 186) 
4. Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Like the Digital Signature Algorithm, Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography relies on the difficulty of solving the 
discrete logarithm problem as the basis of its security. 
(NIST Pub 800-57)  The mathematics required for Elliptic 
curve Cryptography is well beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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An excellent tutorial including Java applets is located on 
the website of Certicom 
(http://www.certicom.com/index.php/ecc-tutorial).  Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography is a newer version of Public-Key 
Cryptology and can provide the same level of security as 
RSA, but with smaller key sizes.  This enables platforms 
with constrained resources such as handheld wireless 
devices to use strong cryptographic algorithms.  With all 
variables being equal, Elliptic Curve Cryptography can run 
more transactions per second than RSA. (Mogollon, M., 2008)  
Figure 4 is from National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Special (NIST) Publication NIST PUB 800-57, 
March 2008, Recommendation for Key Management. 
 
Figure 4.   NIST Comparable Key Strengths 
(From:NIST Publication 800-57) 
In the NIST comparable key strengths table, D-H stands 
for Diffie-Hellman, and FFC and IFC stand for Finite Field 
Cryptology and Integer Factorization Cryptology, 
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respectively.  This table clearly articulates that Elliptic 
Curve Cryptology (ECC) achieves the same level of security 
as symmetric ciphers with keys having roughly twice the 
number of bits, whereas the D-H and RSA algorithms have 
significantly larger key sizes.  A symmetric key length of 
112 bits is the standard minimum as of 2010 and will be 
until 2030.  The National Security Agency has adopted ECDSA 
(Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) because it is 
considered to be second-generation public key cryptography 
and offers relatively smaller key sizes in contrast to the 
first generation (e.g. D-H and RSA).  The National Security 
Agency stated, “As vendors look to upgrade their systems 
they should seriously consider the elliptic curve 
alternative for the computational and bandwidth advantages 
they offer at comparable security.” 
(http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml)  
C. CIPHERS BELIEVED TO BE RESISTANT TO QUANTUM COMPUTING 
1. Hash-Based Digital Signature Schemes 
To recap, hash-based algorithms are one-way algorithms 
that take in any size of input in the form of bits and 
produce a digital signature that is a fixed size that 
depends on the algorithm.  In order for a cryptographic 
hash function to be considered secure, the hash function 
must be able to input any amount of data, output a fixed-
length digest, be fast to compute, be hard to invert, and 
produce few collisions. In other words, if Y = F(x), where 
Y is the digest, F is the hash algorithm, and x is the  
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message, if an adversary obtained Y and knew F, it would be 
“effectively impossible to compute ‘x.’” (Merkle, R. C., 
1979) 
Since hash-based algorithms are only considered secure 
if they are collision resistant, hash-based signature 
schemes are considered to be the “…most important post-
quantum signature candidate” (Bechmann, J., Dahman, E., 
Szydlo, M., 2009) because the security of these functions 
relies on their collision resistance.  The digital 
signature schemes are also useful because they can be 
implemented in hardware and software making them 
prospective alternatives to the popular RSA and elliptic-
curve digital signature schemes that are predicted to be 
vulnerable in a quantum computing era. (Bechmann, J., 
Dahman, E., Szydlo, M., 2009) 
The mathematics of the following hash-based signature 
schemes is beyond the scope of this thesis, but Bechmann, 
Dahman, and Szydlo state that the Lamport-Diffie One-Time 
Signature Scheme, Winternitz One-Time Signature Scheme, and 
Merkle Signature Scheme (Merkle’s tree) are all hash-based 
algorithms, with Merkle’s tree being the most efficient.  
The Merkle scheme is actually a multi-time signature that 
employs a version of the Lamport-Diffie signature scheme, 
but the Merkle scheme can convert any one-time signature 
scheme to create a multiple-use or multi-time signature 
scheme. (Garcia, L. C.) 
2. McElice Code-Based Encryption System 
Code-based cryptography relies on error-correcting 
codes such as the McEliece Hidden-Goppa-Code cryptosystem, 
in which the security of the algorithm relies on the 
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difficulty of decoding a general linear code in polynomial 
time. (Berlekamp, E. R., McEliece, R. J., Van Tilborg, H. 
C., 1978)  Although not as efficient as RSA, the McEliece 
Hidden-Goppa-Code cryptosystem is expected to hold up to 
quantum computers.  The current drawback to the McEliece 
cryptosystem is that the key sizes are in the millions of 
bits, whereas RSA key sizes are in the thousands of bits. 
(Bernstein, D. J., 2009) 
The McEliece cryptosystem uses three algorithms to 
create the public and private-key pair, to encrypt the 
message, and to decrypt the message.  To create the public 
key (G(prime), T(errors)) Alice selects a binary linear code 
C(linear code) capable of correcting T(errors) and creates a 
generator matrix G(generator matrix) of (N(length), K(dimension)).  The 
generator matrix is hidden using a random non-singular 
binary square substitution matrix S(substitution matrix) of 
(K(dimension) x K(dimension)) size and a random permutation matrix 
P(permutation matrix) of (N(length) x (N(length)) size. (Heyse, S., 
2009)  A permutation matrix is also a binary square matrix 
that has exactly one entry of 1 for any column and row with 
0 in all other spaces.  Figure 5 provides an example of a 
permutation matrix.  G(prime) is created by computing the 




Figure 5.   Permutation Matrix Example 
(From:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Symmetric_
group_3;_Cayley_table;_matrices.svg) 
The secret key is the combined knowledge of three different 
matrices that created the public key: G(generator matrix), 
S(substitution matrix), and P(permutation matrix). (Heyse, S., 2009) 
Encryption and decryption is similar to other public-
key cryptosystems: if Bob wishes to send Alice an encrypted 
message, Bob uses Alice’s public key (G(prime), T(errors)), but 
he also introduces error into the message not to exceed the 
amount of T(errors).  To decrypt the message, Alice uses her 
secret key to produce the plaintext from the ciphertext 
provided that Bob did not introduce an error larger then 
C(linear code). (Heyse, S., 2009) 
3. NTRU Lattice-Based Cryptography 
Recall that quantum computers will excel at cracking 
algorithms that rely on the difficulty of factoring large 
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numbers or solving the discrete logarithm problem as the 
basis for their security.  Therefore, cryptologists have 
searched for a different mathematical problem to use as the 
basis of an algorithm’s security, and Lattice problems are 
one such problem. (Perlner, R. A., Cooper, D. A., 2009)  
“Lattice based systems provide a good alternative since 
they are based on a long-standing open problem for 
classical computation.”  (Hallgren, S, Vollmer, U., 2009) 
Collectively, the basis of a lattice is a set of 
vectors that can be expressed as a sum of integer multiples 
of a set of n vectors.  “(It is important to) note that 
there are an infinite number of different bases that will 
all generate the same lattice.” (Perlner, R. A., Cooper, D. 
A., 2009)  Two problems believed to be hard for classical 
and quantum computational models are solving either the 
closest vector problem or shortest vector problem of high-
dimensional lattices.  The mathematics of Lattice-Based 
Cryptography is beyond the scope of this thesis, but there 
is commercial deployment of Lattice-Based Cryptography, and 
the NTRUEncrypt Public-Key Cryptosystem “appears to be the 
most practical.”  (Perlner, R. A., Cooper, D. A., 2009) 
“The (NTRU) encryption procedure uses a mixing system 
based on polynomial algebra and reduction modulo two 
numbers p and q, while the decryption procedure uses an 
unmixing system whose validity depends on elementary 
probability theory.  The security of the NTRU public-key 
cryptosystem comes from the interaction of the polynomial 
mixing system with the independence of reduction modulo p 
and q.  Its security also relies on the (experimentally 
observed) fact that for most lattices, it is very difficult 
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to find extremely short (as opposed to moderately short) 
vectors.” (Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J., Silverman, J. H., 
1998) 
Like Elliptic Curve Cryptology, the NTRU Public-key 
cryptosystem might become an alternative algorithm for 
computing devices that require high-performance security 
but that have fewer resources then a typical PC, e.g., 
handheld devices such as tablets, cellphones, and PDAs.  
With key length requirements of 112 bits or greater, the 
NTRU cryptosystem is able sign and verify signatures, 
encrypt messages, and decrypt messages faster than Elliptic 
Curve Cryptology and therefore faster than RSA. 
 
Figure 6.   Encryption/Decryption Operations per second for 





Figure 7.   Signatures and signature verifications per second 
for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature and NTRUSign 
(From:Practical lattice-based cryptography 
NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign, Hoffstein, J. et al) 
As evident in Figures 6 and 7, the NTRU cryptosystem 
offers higher performance than ECDSA, but unfortunately 
NTRUEncrypt did not have a formal proof of security like 
RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptology, and other practical schemes 
until 2008. (Naslund, M. Shparlinski, I. E., Whyte, W., 
2003).  NTRU received much popular support for ten years 
until the proposed IEEE standard P1363.1 became an approved 
standard in December 2008.  Now IEEE Std 1363.1TM-2008, IEEE 
Standard Specification for Public Key Cryptographic 
Techniques Based on Hard Problems over Lattices, is an 
international standard and is starting to be adopted by 
commercial vendors. 
4. Multivariate Quadratic Public-Key Cryptography 
Although the mathematics is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, Daniel Bernstein, a leader in this field, lists 
Multivariate-Quadratic-Equations Public-Key Cryptography as 
another alternative in his book, “Introduction to Post 
Quantum Cryptography.” 
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The security of the Multivariate-Quadratic-Equations 
Public-Key Cryptography is based on the difficulty of 
solving nonlinear equations over a finite field, which is 
considered to be an NP-hard problem.  This algorithm has 
been under intensive study for the last couple of decades, 
but experts do not recommend using Multivariate-Quadratic-
Equations for protecting security-critical applications yet 
because the basis of its security is not well understood, 
and vulnerabilities are being found on a regular basis. 
(Bernstein, D. J., 2009) 
5. Advanced Encryption System (AES) - Symmetric 
(Secret-Key) Cryptography 
Throughout this thesis, references have been made to 
key-size security equivalence to symmetric cryptography 
when discussing RSA, Elliptic-Curve Cryptography, and NTRU 
Lattice-Based Cryptography.  The Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) is the standard cipher for symmetric 
cryptography, also known as “secret-key” cryptography.  
Recall that secret-key cryptography is the fastest and 
provides the most encryption strength per bit of key and 
that a major purpose of slower public-key cryptography is 
to help facilitate the exchange of a symmetric session key. 
In the late 1990s, the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) held a competition to replace the 
successful symmetric algorithm DES (Data Encryption 
Standard) that was developed by IBM in the 1970s.  NIST 
reached out to the cryptographic community for those who 
were interested in submitting an algorithm to be the new 
standard.  After fifteen nominated AES candidates, the 
Rijndael algorithm, developed by two Belgians, Joan Daemen 
 36 
and Vincent Rijmen, won the contest, and their cipher was 
announced as the winner in October 2000.  As per the 
requirements of the NIST contest for AES, the Rijndael 
algorithm supports block lengths of 128, 192, and 256-bits. 
(Schmeh, K, 2003) 
Although a brute-force attack for a key length of 128 
bits is “…out of the question for Rijnadael,” as Klaus 
Schmeh stated, there is a small concern for the reliability 
of the algorithm because it is fairly new.  However, the 
strength and usability of AES is evident by the US 
Government’s approval of its use for classified information 
processing.  Specifically, the National Security Agency 
approved all block lengths of the AES algorithm to protect 
classified information up to Secret, but only the 192- and 
256-bit block lengths are approved for Top Secret material 
as per the Security on National Security Systems Policy, 
CNSS Policy No. 15, Fact Sheet No. 1, National Policy on 
the Use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect 
National Security Systems and National Security 




IV. APPLICATIONS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY CURRENTLY IN USE 
A CIPHERS VULNERABLE TO QUANTUM COMPUTERS 
1. Introduction 
Suppose that CNN were to report that a large-scale, 
fault-tolerant quantum computer has been developed; how 
would users of cryptography cope?  This section focuses on 
the potential impact of quantum computers on various 
parties from individual users to the world economy. 
2. Online Banking Statistics 
Since 2009, the American Bankers Association reported 
that online banking is the preferred method of performing 
banking transactions.  Figure 8 shows the online banking 
trend from 2007 to 2011 for all age groups.  In 2007, 
online banking made up roughly 23 percent of all banking 
transactions, but in 2011, online banking accounted for 
roughly 61 percent of all banking transactions.  This 
report does not include the statistics from other large 
banking spheres such as the European Union or banking 




Figure 8.   Preferred Banking Method 2011 Report 
(From:http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/090811Consumer
PreferencesSurvey.htm) 
3. Online Shopping Statistics 
The sudden emergence of quantum computers could have a 
significant impact on the world economy if users of 
cryptography are caught unprepared.  The Nielsen Company 
reported in 2007 that 875 million consumers had shopped 
online, an increase of over 40 percent since the previous 
survey was conducted in 2005.  The survey also found that 
85 percent of all Internet users had conducted an online 
transaction.  Comparing the percentage of those who had 
Internet access and those who used the Internet to conduct 
an online transaction, the countries that had the highest 
online shopping percentages in 2007 were South Korea at 99 
percent, the United Kingdom at 97 percent, Germany at 97 
percent, Japan at 97 percent, and in eighth place, the 
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United States, where 94 percent of those who had Internet 
access used the Internet to conduct an online transaction. 
B. TECHNOLOGIES CURRENTLY IN USE FOR SECURING INTERNET 
TRANSACTIONS 
1. Introduction 
The reason why most of the transactions outlined in 
Section 'A' of this chapter are vulnerable is that they use 
the technologies discussed in this section.  The sudden 
emergence of a large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computer 
would render the following cryptographic technologies 
ineffective. 
2. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
Invented by Netscape in the 1990s, the Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) uses the Transport Control Protocol (TCP) to 
provide encryption, authentication, and integrity for HTTP, 
LDAP, and POP3 applications.  SSL is the most commonly used 
technology for securing online transactions. 
Secure Socket Layer was designed to have the server 
authenticate itself to the user.  During a SSL session, the 
user requests to setup a secure channel with the server.  
The server then sends to the user the server's public key 
so that the user can validate whether or not the server is 
using a trusted certificate authority.  A certificate 
authority is the issuer of certificates and will be 
discussed further in the Public-Key Infrastructure section 
below.  If the user confirms that the certificate authority 
is trustworthy, the client creates a session key that is 
based on a symmetric encryption algorithm and encrypts it 
with the server's public key so that only the server can 
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decrypt the session key. Once the server decrypts the 
session key, secure communication using symmetric 
cryptography can begin. 
The problem is that the Secure Socket Layer protocol 
uses RSA and Diffie-Hellman for the majority of its public-
key transactions.  SSL also can use Fortezza Cards that 
have been used by government, military, and banking 
institutions to protect sensitive data, but since Fortezza 
Cards are not common, they go beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  Therefore, unless you are required to use a 
Fortezza card for your Internet transaction, you are using 
either RSA or Diffie-Hellman as your public-key algorithm, 
and this renders your SSL session vulnerable to quantum 
computers. 
3. Secure Shell (SSH) 
As a secure alternative to Telnet for remote 
networking administration, Secure Shell (SSH) can also be 
used to secure protocols like HTTP and FTP that are used to 
transfer data from websites or files like the Secure Socket 
Layer system.  Secure Shell was originally created in 1996 
by Tatu Ylonen at the Helsinki University of Technology in 
Finland. Ylonen started his own company, SSH 
Communications, and later improved the protocol in 1998 
when he released SSH2.  After working with the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority, Ylonen's work was implemented 
as an Internet Standard under RFC 4250 in 2006 as the 
Secure Shell Protocol. 
Secure Shell uses RSA as its Public-Key Algorithm to 
initially set up the session key. Therefore, since RSA uses 
factoring large numbers as the basis of its security, and 
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quantum computers reduce the time to factor large numbers 
from exponential to polynomial time, Secure Shell in its 
current form will be vulnerable in a quantum computing era. 
4. Digital Certificates 
In the sections above, we have discussed how public-
key cryptography is used when Alice wants to verify that 
Bob is who he claims to be while exchanging a session key 
to conduct secure communication between Alice and Bob.  
Digital certificates, also known as certificates, enable 
this transaction to occur.  Digital certificates are used 
to certify that Alice is in fact Alice.  With public-key 
cryptography, recall that two keys are generated, one being 
the public-key that is available to the public, and the 
other being Alice’s private-key that is held securely in 
Alice’s possession.  The private-key can be held on a disk, 
programmed into a smartcard, or loaded onto Alice’s 
personal computer, with the latter being less secure.  
Digital certificates bind Alice’s identity to her public 
key.  Along with the public key, the digital certificate 
holds other information like Alice’s name, a serial number, 
the Certificate Authority who issued Alice her certificate, 
the algorithm used to generate the digital certificate, and 
the certificate’s expiration date.  With this information, 
Bob could first see that the certificate is assigned to 
Alice, verify that the certificate has not expired, 
identify whether or not the Certificate Authority itself is 
a trustworthy issuer of certificates, and then verify 
Alice’s public key. 
Digital certificates are extremely popular because 
once the digital certificates have been issued to a user, 
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iterative validation can occur, or validation that is 
pushed to individual PCs vice a central server.  If 
validation were recursive in nature and could only be 
performed by the Certificate Authority, this would make 
denial-of-service attacks easier because a successful 
denial-of-service attack on the single point of failure 
would disrupt all users who were issued certificates from 
that Certificate Authority.  Therefore, because digital 
certificate validation is iterative and decentralized by 
design, millions of secure transactions may occur without 
the threat of availability attacks on a central server.  
Unfortunately, the system is only as secure as the strength 
of algorithm that is used.  Under RFC 3279, Algorithms and 
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 
Profile, the public-key algorithm used is RSA.  We have 
shown that the use of RSA as a public-key algorithm will 
make digital certificates vulnerable once large-scale, 
fault-tolerant quantum computers come into existence, if no 
suitable alternative algorithm is put in place before the 
emergence of quantum computers. 
5. Digital Signatures 
Using the private-key contained in Alice’s digital 
certificate, Alice is able to sign the messages she sends 
to Bob so that Bob recognizes the signature to be only from 
Alice.  Although digital signatures are supposed to mimic 
the actual signing of hard-copy letters, they are not 
physical signatures that are scanned and attached to 
letters because this format could easily be copied by Eve 
and used to send erroneous emails with Alice’s signature, 
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i.e., through a replay attack. In contrast to a physical 
signature, a digital signature is a combination of the 
message, the hash of the message, and a hash of the message 
encrypted with Alice’s private-key.  Alice sends her signed 
message along with her public certificate to Bob, who uses 
Alice’s public key to decrypt the hash, after first using 
Alice’s certificate to validate her public key (using the 
certificate authority’s public key to verify the 
certificate).  To protect the confidentiality of the 
message, it may be encrypted with a symmetric cipher, and 
the symmetric key is encrypted with Bob’s public key (and 
decrypted with Bob’s private key).  Bob computes the hash 
of the message and compares it with the decrypted hash 
value. 
Like digital certificates, digital signatures are only 
as good as the algorithm that makes them, and per RFC 3279, 
the two algorithms in use for digital certificates are DSA 
and ECDSA.  Like RSA, quantum computers are believed to 
make these algorithms vulnerable because of the mathematics 
these algorithms are based upon.  Therefore, unless another 
algorithm is added to RFC 3279 that is resistant to quantum 
computers as an alternate standard, quantum computers will 
make the forging of digital signatures possible. 
6. Public-Key Infrastructure 
One of the largest organizational public-key 
infrastructures in existence is the United States 
Department of Defense infrastructure, and this system will 
be used to explain the elements and processes within a 
public-key infrastructure that secures communication.  The 
process begins with the issuance of a Department of Defense 
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identification card.  A government employee, who could be 
military, government employed civilian, or government 
employed contractor, obtains an ID card by providing 
different forms of government-issued identification to the 
Department of Defense Identification office in person.  If 
sufficient identification is present, the government 
employee is issued a Common Access Card (CAC), also known 
as a CAC Card.  
A Department of Defense Common Access Card contains 
standard identification elements found on government-issued 
ID cards (e.g., driver’s license) such as photograph, name, 
birth date, issue date, and expiration date.  The CAC also 
contains a chip that holds the member’s public and private 
certificates that are issued at the time the member 
receives his or her CAC.  The ID card office receives the 
certificates securely from the Department of Defense 
Certificate Authority and installs them onto the CAC.  
After a process of about 20 minutes, the new employee can 
access websites that are secured with the Department of 
Defense’s public-key infrastructure or digitally sign 
messages with the member’s new digital certificates that 
can be verified by other members within the system. 
If the government employee is a student at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and wishes to access the school’s 
websites that are secured with the Department of Defense’s 
public-key infrastructure without receiving multiple 
security warnings from his or her Internet browser, he or 
she must install the Department of Defense’s root 
certificate onto his or her machine.  A public-key 
infrastructure is a hierarchical system where all 
certificates stem from the root certificate. The root 
 45 
certificate is the Certificate Authority’s public key along 
with the Certificate Authority’s digital signature of its 
public key. The root certificate is the only certificate 
that is self-signed by the owner’s (Certificate 
Authority’s) private key. 
This system harnesses the strength of RSA’s public-key 
algorithm for the protection of data confidentiality and 
data integrity.  Furthermore, since public-key 
infrastructures use iterative/decentralized validation, 
where the user’s PC can validate a website’s certificates 
if the PC has the root-certificate installed, it is 
difficult for an attacker to conduct a denial-of-service 
attack on the Department of Defense’s public-key 
infrastructure, making this system highly reliable for 
sending information in a manner that protects 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  
Unfortunately, this system is based on the RSA algorithm, 
and if an attacker had access to large-scale, fault-
tolerant quantum computers, this infrastructure would be 
made vulnerable. 
C. APPLICATIONS BELIEVED TO BE QUANTUM COMPUTING 
RESISTANT 
1. Introduction 
The following section identifies cryptographic 
technologies believed to be quantum computing resistant.  
Therefore, assuming that large-scale, fault-tolerant 
quantum computers have not been realized yet, there is time 
to implement alternative ciphers. 
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2. Symmetric Cryptography 
Symmetric cryptography that currently protects the 
largest bulk of secure electronic communications will 
remain in a quantum-computing era because it is believed to 
be quantum computing resistant.  Given that symmetric 
cryptography is believed to be resistant to quantum 
computers, algorithms like the Advanced Encryption System 
(AES), which as mentioned earlier is cleared by the 
National Security Agency to secure Top Secret transmission, 
the United States’ most classified and sensitive 
information, will still hold strong against quantum 
computers.  Therefore, the session keys that are exchanged 
within the client/server architecture for Internet 
transactions like the end-user’s PC and his or her bank 
server will also remain secure for these transactions.  
Unfortunately, key distribution is more challenging with 
symmetric cryptography; therefore, symmetric cryptography 
must be combined with some form of asymmetric cryptography 
in order to distribute symmetric keys over the web.  
Fortunately, several quantum-resistant algorithms and 
implementations, such as the NTRUEncrypt Public-Key Crypto 
system, which uses lattice-based cryptography, are 
available to distribute the symmetric session keys, and 
NTRUEncrypt’s implementation of lattice-based cryptography 
is believed to be quantum resistant. 
3. NTRUEncrypt Public-Key Crypto System 
According to techworld.com, which announced the X9.98 
standard in April of 2011, "NTRUEncrypt, [is] the fastest 
public key algorithm you've never heard of."  In contrast 
to RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptology (ECC), NTRUEncrypt is 
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faster, more efficient, and resistant to quantum computers 
because the cipher is lattice-based (the mathematics of 
lattice-based cryptography are beyond the scope of this 
thesis). I.e., NTRUEncrypt is able to function fully as a 
public-key algorithm like the widely used RSA algorithm, 
but does so in a more efficient manner. 
Fortunately, the techworld.com statement wasn't 100 
percent accurate because obviously if the Accredited 
Standards Committee X9 Incorporated, Financial Industry 
Standards, created the X9.98 standard for financial 
institutions to start using NTRUEncrypt to establish secure 
communications for financial service in November 2010, then 
someone has heard of NTRUEncrypt.  In fact, JAVA released 
an application programming interface, Bouncy Castle 1.47, 
containing variants that include a lightweight version of 
the NTRUEncrypt Public-Key Cryptosystem in March 2012 
(bouncycastle.org). 
 
Figure 9.   Relative Performance of LBP-PKE, RSA, and ECC 
(From:X9extra, Volume 2, Number 1, April 2011) 
Figure 9 shows the relative performance for "Lattice-
Based Polynomial Public-Key Encryption" (X9extra, Volume 2, 
Number 1, April 2011), RSA, and ECC. The reader can see via 
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the operations per second in the last three columns that 
NTRUEncrypt outperforms ECC and RSA by as much as 638:1. 
4. Kerberos 
In Greek mythology, there was the country of Kerberos 
where no one could be trusted.  The country was named after 
a three-headed dog that guarded the gate of purgatory.  
Greek legend states that in the land of Kerberos, if you 
desired to deliver any package to anyone, you and the 
package would be exposed to evil monsters and goblins that 
could take your shape and do malicious things in your name.  
Therefore, no one in the land of Kerberos could be trusted.  
Ironically, in the Information Age, the land of Kerberos 
has become reality, where evil users like Eve can take your 
identification and use it to perform malicious activities.  
Thanks to the founders of the Kerberos Authentication 
System invented at MIT, a tool is available that uses an 
authentication process similar in form to the three-headed 
dog Kerberos, as shown in Figure 10.  For more information 




Figure 10.   Simplified Kerberos authentication protocol 
(From:http://gost.isi.edu/publications/kerberos-
neuman-tso.html)  
The Kerberos application, invented at MIT, is a 
trusted third-party protocol that handles user 
authentication.  Using Figure 10 as a visual reference for 
information flow, if Alice (who is represented by 'C' for 
client) wants to talk to Bob (who is represented by 'V' for 
verifier) on a Kerberos Authentication system, Alice must 
first register her required information on the Kerberos 
Server (which is represented by 'AS' for Authentication 
Server) that includes a secret shared only between Alice 
and the Kerberos server.  Once registered, when Alice wants 
to talk to Bob, she must first authenticate herself to the 
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Kerberos server by logging onto the network.  During the 
authentication process, the workstation that Alice is using 
to log onto the network sends Alice's identification to the 
Kerberos server.  The Kerberos server responds by sending a 
session key that will later be shared with the Ticket 
Granting Server (TGS) and a ticket, both encrypted with the 
secret that Alice shares with Kerberos server.  If Alice's 
workstation can successfully decrypt the session key and 
ticket, the workstation will continue the login process 
because Alice has successfully authenticated herself. 
Once Alice has successfully logged onto the network, 
she then requests to talk to Bob via the TGS by sending the 
ticket that the Kerberos server provided her.  The ticket 
contains a copy of the session key provided to Alice and 
Alice's identity encrypted with the secret that only the 
Kerberos server and TGS share.  Once the TGS decrypts the 
ticket and verifies that Alice's identification is bound to 
the session key, the TGS knows that Alice is a trusted 
party because the Kerberos server (third-party), which the 
TGS identifies as a trusted user, provided Alice with the 
ticket encrypted with a secret that is shared between the 
TGS and Kerberos server only.  The TGS then responds to 
Alice by sending another session key to use with Bob and 
another ticket to send to Bob.  The session key and ticket 
that the TGS sends to Alice is encrypted with the session 
key shared between Alice and the TGS.  Furthermore, the 
session key that Alice and the TGS share can be used by 
Alice to request additional session keys and tickets to use 
with other entities on the network. 
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Once Alice receives the new session key to share with 
Bob and the ticket to send to Bob encrypted with the 
session key shared with the TGS and Alice, she decrypts the 
file, holds onto the session key, and sends Bob the ticket. 
The ticket Alice sends to Bob is similar to the ticket 
Alice first sent to the TGS.  It contains her 
identification and a copy of the session key that the TGS 
sent Alice, both encrypted with the session key that Bob 
and the TGS share.  Bob established his session key with 
the TGS the same way Alice established hers using the 
Kerberos server.  Once Bob decrypts the ticket and verifies 
that Alice's identification is bound to the session key, 
secure communication can begin using secret-key 
cryptography. If Bob were a fileserver for example, the TGS 
would also verify Alice's access rights to the file to 
which she is requesting access and include these privileges 
along with the name of the file Alice wishes to access for 
Bob (the fileserver) to verify prior to giving Alice read 
and/or write access. (Pfleeger, C. P. et al, 2003) 
The benefit of this authentication system is that 
authentication at every step of the process is successfully 
completed without sending any encrypted or unencrypted 
passwords over the network where attackers could capture 
Alice's identity and perform an impersonation attack.  
Furthermore, since Kerberos uses symmetric cryptography, 
Alice's identity will be safe from any new attackers that 
may appear in a quantum-computing era.  Microsoft has 
already adopted Kerberos version 5 as its Windows Sever 
2008 client/server domain logon authentication.  Kerberos 
also supports asymmetric cryptography, but this feature is  
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not covered in this thesis since the algorithm that is used 
for public-key cryptology is RSA (RFC 4556), and is 
vulnerable to quantum computing.    
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V. EXPERIMENTATAL METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. HASH-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY 
1. Hash-Based Cryptography Background 
Our first task was to implement hash-based 
cryptography in the C programming language.  We followed 
the description of hash-based cryptography in the 2010 
Springer book, Post-Quantum Cryptography, edited by Daniel 
J. Bernstein, Johannes Buchmann, and Erik Dahmen.  For our 
hash function, we used the MD5 implementation by Ronald 
Rivest at MIT (http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Md5.c) 
Post-Quantum Cryptography describes a hash-based 
public-key signature system based on a standard 
cryptographic hash function H with a digest of length 2b 
bits. The signer’s public key consists of 4b strings y1[0], 
y1[1], y2[0], y2[1], …, y2b[0], y2b[1] of length 2b bits. The 
signer’s secret key consists of 4b random strings x1[0], 
x1[1], x2[0], x2[1], …, x2b[0], x2b[1] of length 2b bits. The 
signer generates the public key by computing y1[0] = 
H(x1[0]), y1[1] = H(x1[1]), y2[0] = H(x2[0]), y2[1] = 
H(x2[1]), …, y2b[0] = H(x2b[0]), y2b[1] = H(x2b[1]). 
A message m is signed by computing y = H(r, m), where 
r is a random string.  The signer then sends the signature, 
which consists of r followed by x1[h1], …, x2b[h2b].  The 
unused x values are discarded, and no further messages may 
be signed.  This scheme is the Lamport-Diffie one-time 
signature system [W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New Directions 
in Cryptography.  IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 
Vol. 22, No. 6, November 1976, pages 644-654] 
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2. Hash-Based Cryptography Implementation 
Our implementation consists of two separate programs.  
The first program (separate1.c) is the signature generation 
process, and the second program (separate2.c) is the 
signature verification process. Both involve modifying 
Rivest’s Md5.c program as follows (please note that for the 
sake of brevity, only the modified functions are shown): 
 
/********** Helper Functions ***********/ 
 




  int i, j, k; 
  MD5_CTX mdContext; 
  unsigned int len = strlen (inString); 
 
  MD5Init (&mdContext); 
  MD5Update (&mdContext, inString, len); 
  MD5Final (&mdContext); 
 
  k = 0; 
  for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { 
    for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) { 
      if ((mdContext.digest[i] >> (7-j)) & 1 == 1) 
        outString[k] = '1'; 
      else 
        outString[k] = '0'; 
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      k++; 
    } 
  } 
  outString[k] = '\0'; 
} 
 
void replaceCR(char *buf, int size) 
{ 
  int i; 
  for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 
    if (buf[i] == '\n') 
      buf[i] = '\0'; 
} 
 
void clear(char *buf, int size) 
{ 
  int i; 
  for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 
    buf[i] = '\0'; 
} 
 
#define B 64 
 




  int i, j; 
  int b = B; 
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  char **y0, **y1, **x0, **x1; 
  unsigned int r, bit; 
  char R[32+1], message[256], concat[512], concat2[512]; 
  char buf[2 * B + 1], buf2[2 * B + 1]; 
  char buf3[2 * B + 1], output[2 * B + 1]; 
 
  // Clear out buffers before using 
  clear(R, 33); 
  clear(message, 256); 
  clear(concat, 512); 
  clear(concat2, 512); 
  clear(buf, 2 * B + 1); 
  clear(buf2, 2 * B + 1); 
  clear(buf3, 2 * B + 1); 
  clear(output, 2 * B + 1); 
 
  // Generate random number r 
  srand(time(0)); 
  r = (unsigned int)random(); 
   
  // Convert r into a string 
  clear(R, 33); 
  for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { 
    bit = (r >> i) & 0x1; 
    R[i] = '0' + bit; 
  } 
  printf(“%s\n”, R); 
 
  // Read user-generated message to be signed 
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  clear(message, 256); 
  fgets(message, 256, stdin); 
  replaceCR(message, 256); 
  printf(“%s\n”, message); 
 
  // Concatenate the two strings: message and R 
  clear(concat, 512); 
  clear(concat2, 512); 
  strcpy(concat,R); 
  strcat(concat,message); 
 
  // Compute the MD5 hash of the concatenation 
  MDString2(concat,concat2); 
 
  clear(output, 2 * b + 1); 
  strncpy(output,concat2,2 * b); 
  output[2 * b] = '\0'; 
 
  // Allocate space for the private key 
  x0 = (char **)malloc(2 * b * sizeof(char *)); 
  if (!x0) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
    return -1; 
  } 
  x1 = (char **)malloc(2 * b * sizeof(char *)); 
  if (!x1) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
    return -1; 
  } 
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  // Generate the private key 
  for (i = 0; i < 2 * b; i ++) { 
    x0[i] = (char *)malloc((2 * b + 1)* sizeof(char)); 
    if (!x0[i]) { 
      fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
      return -1; 
    } 
    for (j = 0; j < 2 * b; j++) { 
      x0[i][j] = (((unsigned int)random()) % 2) + '0'; 
    } 
    x0[i][j] = '\0'; 
  } 
 
  for (i = 0; i < 2 * b; i ++) { 
    x1[i] = (char *)malloc((2 * b + 1) * sizeof(char)); 
    if (!x1[i]) { 
      fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
      return -1; 
    } 
    for (j = 0; j < 2 * b; j++) { 
      x1[i][j] = (((unsigned int)random()) % 2) + '0'; 
    } 
    x1[i][j] = '\0'; 
  } 
 
  // Allocate space for the public key 
  y0 = (char **)malloc(2 * b * sizeof(char *)); 
  if (!y0) { 
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    fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
    return -1; 
  } 
  y1 = (char **)malloc(2 * b * sizeof(char *)); 
  if (!y1) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
    return -1; 
  } 
 
  // Generate the public key 
  for (i = 0; i < 2 * b; i ++) { 
    y0[i] = (char *)malloc((2 * b + 1) * sizeof(char)); 
    if (!y0[i]) { 
      fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
      return -1; 
    } 
    clear(buf, 2 * b + 1); 
    clear(buf2, 2 * b + 1); 
    strncpy(buf,x0[i],2 * b); 
    MDString2(buf,buf2); 
    clear(y0[i], 2 * b + 1); 
    strncpy(y0[i],buf2, 2 * b); 
    y0[i][2 * b] = '\0'; 
    printf("%s\n", y0[i]); 
  } 
  for (i = 0; i < 2 * b; i ++) { 
    y1[i] = (char *)malloc((2 * b + 1) * sizeof(char)); 
    if (!y1[i]) { 
      fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
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      return -1; 
    } 
    clear(buf, 2 * b + 1); 
    clear(buf2, 2 * b + 1); 
    strncpy(buf,x1[i],2 * b); 
    MDString2(buf,buf2); 
    clear(y1[i], 2 * b + 1); 
    strncpy(y1[i],buf2,2 * b); 
    y1[i][2 * b] = '\0'; 
    printf("%s\n", y1[i]); 
  } 
 
  // Signature generation 
  for (i = 0; i < 2 * b; i++) { 
    if (output[i] == '0') { 
      printf("%s\n",x0[i]); 
    } else if (output[i] == '1') { 
      printf("%s\n",x1[i]); 
    } else { 
      fprintf(stderr, "fatal error\n"); 
      return; 
    } 
  } 
  fprintf(stderr, "Signature generation suceeded\n"); 
  return 0; 
} 
 
Signature verification (separate2.c) is accomplished by 
modifying Md5.c as follows (note that for the sake of 
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brevity, only the modified functions are shown, and the 
helper functions MDString2(), replaceCR(), and clear() 
already shown above are not shown here): 
 
#define B 64 
 




  int i, j; 
  int b = B; 
  char **y0, **y1, **x0, **x1;; 
  unsigned int r, bit; 
  char R[256], message[256], concat[512], concat2[512]; 
  char buf[2 * B + 2], buf2[2 * B + 2]; 
  char buf3[2 * B + 2], buf4[256], output[2 * B + 2]; 
 
  // Clear out buffers before using 
  clear(R, 256); clear(message, 256); clear(concat, 512); 
  clear(concat2, 512); clear(buf, 2 * B + 2); 
  clear(buf2, 2 * B + 2); clear(buf3, 2 * B + 2); 
  clear(buf4, 256); clear(output, 2 * B + 2); 
 
  // Read in random string R 
  clear(R, 256); 
  fgets(R, 256, stdin); 
  replaceCR(R, 256); 
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  // Read in the message 
  clear(message, 256); 
  fgets(message, 256, stdin); 
  replaceCR(message, 256); 
  clear(concat, 512); 
  clear(concat2, 512); 
  strcpy(concat,R); 
  strcat(concat,message); 
  MDString2(concat,concat2); 
  clear(output, 2 * B + 2); 
  strncpy(output,concat2,2*b); 
  replaceCR(output, 2 * B + 2); 
 
  // Allocate space for the public key 
  y0 = (char **)malloc(2 * b * sizeof(char *)); 
  if (!y0) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
    return -1; 
  } 
  y1 = (char **)malloc(2 * b * sizeof(char *)); 
  if (!y1) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
    return -1; 
  } 
  
 // Read in the public key 
  for (i = 0; i < 2 * b; i++) { 
    y0[i] = (char *)malloc((2 * b + 2) * sizeof(char)); 
    if (!y0[i]) { 
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      fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
      return -1; 
    } 
    clear(y0[i], 2 * b + 2); 
    fgets(y0[i], 2 * b + 2, stdin); 
    replaceCR(y0[i], 2 * b + 2); 
  } 
 
  for (i = 0; i < 2 * b; i++) { 
    y1[i] = (char *)malloc((2 * b + 2) * sizeof(char)); 
    if (!y1[i]) { 
      fprintf(stderr, "malloc returned null!"); 
      return -1; 
    } 
    fgets(y1[i], 2 * b + 2, stdin); 
    replaceCR(y1[i], 2 * b + 2); 
  } 
 
  // Signature verification 
  for (i = 0; i < 2 * b; i++) { 
    if (output[i] == '0') { 
      clear(buf, 2 * b + 2); 
      // Read in part of the signature 
      fgets(buf, 2 * b + 2, stdin); 
      replaceCR(buf, 2 * b + 2); 
      // Is H(buf) the same as y0[i]? 
      MDString2(buf,buf2); 
      clear(buf3, 2 * b + 2); 
      for (j = 0; j < 2 * b; j++) { 
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        buf3[j] = y0[i][j]; 
      } 
      if (strncmp(buf2, buf3, 2 * b) != 0) { 
        fprintf(stderr, "Signature verification failed\n"); 
        return -1; 
      } 
    } else if (output[i] == '1') { 
      clear(buf, 2 * b + 2); 
      // Read in part of the signature 
      fgets(buf, 2 * b + 2, stdin); 
      replaceCR(buf, 2 * b + 2); 
      // Is H(buf) the same as y1[i]? 
      MDString2(buf,buf2); 
      clear(buf3, 2 * b + 2); 
      for (j = 0; j < 2 * b; j++) { 
        buf3[j] = y1[i][j]; 
      } 
      if (strncmp(buf2, buf3, 2 * b) != 0) { 
        fprintf(stderr, "Signature verification failed\n"); 
        return -1; 
      } 
    } else { 
      fprintf(stderr, "fatal error\n"); 
      return; 
    } 
  } 
  fprintf(stderr,"Signature verification succeeded\n"); 




The user follows the following steps to compile the 
above code: 
 
% gcc –o separate1 separate1.c 
% gcc –o separate2 separate2.c 
 
Next, the user generates the signature: 
 
% echo “Post-quantum cryptography is fun.” > message 
% ./separate1 < message > signature 
 
The user should see the following output: 
 
Sender: Signature generation succeeded 
 
Next, the user verifies the signature: 
 
% ./separate2 < signature 
 
The user should see the following output: 
 
Signature verification succeeded 
 
The file signature should be similar to the following: 
 
11100110101000101101000111010110 





















B. MCELIECE CRPTOSYSTEM 
1. McEliece Cryptosystem Background 
We found an implementation of a variant of the 
McEliece code-based cryptosystem implemented by Bhaskar 
Biswas and Nicolas Sendrier of the French National 
Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control 
(Institut national de recherché en informatique et en 
automatique, INRIA) in Rocquencourt, France.  The source 
code is distributed as part of the SUPERCOP toolkit 
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developed by the VAMPIRE lab for measuring the performance 
of cryptographic software 
[http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html]. SUPERCOP stands for 
System for Unified Performance Evaluation Related to 
Cryptographic Operations and Primitives.  VAMPIRE stands 
for Virtual Applications and Implementations Research Lab, 
the third lab of ECRYPT, the European Network of Excellence 
in Cryptology II. 
2. McEliece Cryptosystem Implementation 
SUPERCOP measures a variety of cryptographic 
primitives. Anyone can contribute computer time to this 
benchmarking effort by downloading, unpacking, and running 
SUPERCOP on a Unix computer: 
 
% wget http://hyperelliptic.org/ebats/supercop-20120316.tar.bz2 
% bunzip2 < supercop-20120316.tar.bz2 | tar -xf - 
% cd supercop-20120316 
% nohup sh do & 
 
The do script compiles the source code of the 
cryptographic software and generates a file, which the user 
posts to the web and then sends the URL to a mailing list. 
The code compiles and runs on our system, but the 
comments, variable names, and function names are all in 
French. 
Data on the performance of this cryptosystem on a 
variety of machines is available at 
http://bench.cr.yp.to/results-encrypt.html. 
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C. NTRUENCRYPT PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTO SYSTEM 
1. NTRUEncrypt Public-Key Crypto System Background 
An open-source implementation of NTRU 
(http://tbuktu.github.com/ntru/) is available. NTRU is an 
example of lattice-based cryptography.  It has both a 
public-key encryption scheme (NTRUEncrypt) and a digital 
signature scheme (NTRUSign). 
We were able to download and compile the source code 
for NTRU.  We were also able to write our own programs that 
use NTRU in order to encrypt files, decrypt files, sign 
files, and verify signatures. 
2. NTRUEncrypt Public-Key Crypto System 
Implementation 
First, we downloaded the NTRU source code and unpacked 
it on a Unix machine.  Then, we navigated to the demo 
folder: 
 
% jar xvf ntru-1.0-src.jar 
% cd src/main/java/net/sf/ntru/demo 
 
This folder contains an example program that 
demonstrates both encryption and digital signature using 
NTRU. We modified this SimpleExample.java program to open 
the plaintext as a file and store the ciphertext as a file.  
In addition, our modified program saves the public and 
private keys to a file.  Without our modifications, the 
example program generates an EncryptionKeyPair, encrypts a 
hard-coded string with the public key, decrypts the 
ciphertext (stored in a byte array that is a local variable 
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of the function), and then prints the decrypted string. 
With our modifications, it is possible to transfer the 
ciphertext to a different machine for decryption, which we 
successfully tested.  The following is the code of 













public class Encrypt { 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        encrypt(); 
    } 
 
    private static void encrypt() { 
        // create an instance of NtruEncrypt 
        NtruEncrypt ntru = new NtruEncrypt( 
                               EncryptionParameters 
                               .APR2011_439_FAST); 
        // create an encryption key pair 
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        EncryptionKeyPair kp = ntru.generateKeyPair(); 
        byte[] enc = {}; 
        byte[] buf = new byte[64]; 
        File f; 
        FileOutputStream fos; 
        FileInputStream fis; 
        try { 
            // Load the plaintext from disk 
            f = new File("plaintext"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            fis.read(buf); 
            fis.close(); 
            // encrypt the message with the public key 
            enc = ntru.encrypt(buf, kp.getPublic()); 
             
            // Store the public key to disk 
            f = new File("public_key"); 
            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
            kp.getPublic().writeTo(fos); 
            fos.close(); 
            // Store the private key to disk 
            f = new File("private_key"); 
            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
            kp.getPrivate().writeTo(fos); 
            fos.close(); 
            // Store the ciphertext to disk 
            f = new File("ciphertext"); 
            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
            fos.write(enc); 
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            fos.close(); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.err.println("Exception! " + e); 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
To compile and run this program, the user creates a 
plaintext file called plaintext and then types the 
following commands: 
 
% javac -classpath ../../../.. Encrypt.java 
% java -classpath ../../../.. net.sf.ntru.demo.Encrypt 
 
Next, we created another encryption program 
Encrypt2.java that does not create a key pair but instead 














public class Encrypt2 { 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        encrypt(); 
    } 
 
    private static void encrypt() { 
        // create an instance of NtruEncrypt 
        NtruEncrypt ntru = new NtruEncrypt( 
                               EncryptionParameters 
                               .APR2011_439_FAST); 
 
        byte[] enc = {}; 
        byte[] buf = new byte[64]; 
        File f; 
        FileOutputStream fos; 
        FileInputStream fis; 
        EncryptionPrivateKey pri; 
        EncryptionPublicKey pub; 
        try { 
            // Load the public key from disk 
            f = new File("public_key"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            pub = new EncryptionPublicKey(fis, 
                      EncryptionParameters 
                      .APR2011_439_FAST); 
            fis.close(); 
            // Load the plaintext from disk 
            f = new File("plaintext"); 
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            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            fis.read(buf); 
            fis.close(); 
            // Encrypt the message with the public key 
            enc = ntru.encrypt(buf, pub); 
            // Store the ciphertext to a file 
            f = new File("ciphertext"); 
            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
            fos.write(enc); 
            fos.close(); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.err.println("Exception! " + e); 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
To compile and run this program, the user must already 
have an existing public_key file.  The user creates a 
plaintext file called plaintext and then types the 
following commands: 
 
% javac -classpath ../../../.. Encrypt2.java 
% java -classpath ../../../.. net.sf.ntru.demo.Encrypt2 
 
Next, we created a decryption program Decrypt.java that 















public class Decrypt { 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        decrypt(); 
    } 
 
    private static void decrypt() { 
        // create an instance of NtruEncrypt 
        NtruEncrypt ntru = new NtruEncrypt( 
                               EncryptionParameters 
                               .APR2011_439_FAST); 
        byte[] dec = {}; 
        byte[] buf = new byte[1024]; 
        File f; 
        FileOutputStream fos; 
        FileInputStream fis; 
        EncryptionPrivateKey pri; 
        EncryptionPublicKey pub; 
        EncryptionKeyPair pair; 
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        try { 
            // Load the public key from disk 
            f = new File("public_key"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            pub = new EncryptionPublicKey(fis, 
                      EncryptionParameters 
                      .APR2011_439_FAST); 
            fis.close(); 
            // Load the private key from disk 
            f = new File("private_key"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            pri = new EncryptionPrivateKey(fis, 
                      EncryptionParameters 
                      .APR2011_439_FAST); 
            pair = new EncryptionKeyPair(pri, pub); 
            // Load the ciphertext from disk 
            f = new File("ciphertext"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            fis.read(buf); 
            System.out.println(buf); 
            dec = ntru.decrypt(buf, pair); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.err.println("Exception! " + e); 
        } 
        // Print the decrypted message 
        System.out.println("Message:  " + new String(dec)); 




To compile and run this program, the user must already 
have existing ciphertext, public_key and private_key files.  
The user types the following commands: 
 
% javac -classpath ../../../.. Decrypt.java 
% java -classpath ../../../.. net.sf.ntru.demo.Decrypt 
 
Next, we created a program Sign.java to sign a file 
(modified from the example program to read the message from 
the file message and to write the public_signing_key, 















public class Sign { 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        sign(); 
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    } 
 
    private static void sign() { 
        // create an instance of NtruSign 
        NtruSign ntru = new NtruSign( 
                            SignatureParameters.TEST157); 
        // create an signature key pair 
        SignatureKeyPair kp = ntru.generateKeyPair(); 
        byte[] buf = new byte[64]; 
        File f; 
        FileOutputStream fos; 
        FileInputStream fis; 
        try { 
            // Read the message from disk 
            f = new File("message"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            fis.read(buf); 
            fis.close(); 
            // Sign the message with the private key 
            byte[] sig = ntru.sign(buf, kp); 
            // Write the public signing key to disk 
            f = new File("public_signing_key"); 
            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
            kp.getPublic().writeTo(fos); 
            fos.close(); 
            // Write the private signing key to disk 
            f = new File("private_signing_key"); 
            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
            kp.getPrivate().writeTo(fos); 
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            fos.close(); 
            // Write the signature to disk 
            f = new File("signature"); 
            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
            fos.write(sig); 
            fos.close(); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.err.println("Exception! " + e); 
        }         
    } 
} 
 
To compile and run this program, the user creates a 
message file and then types the following commands: 
 
% javac -classpath ../../../.. Sign.java 
% java -classpath ../../../.. net.sf.ntru.demo.Sign 
 
Next, we created Sign2.java, a signature program that 

















public class Sign2 { 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        sign(); 
    } 
 
    private static void sign() { 
        // Create an instance of NtruSign 
        NtruSign ntru = new NtruSign( 
                            SignatureParameters.TEST157); 
        SignatureKeyPair kp; 
        byte[] buf = new byte[64]; 
        byte[] sig = {}; 
        File f; 
        FileOutputStream fos; 
        FileInputStream fis; 
        SignaturePrivateKey pri; 
        SignaturePublicKey pub; 
        try { 
            // Read public signing key from disk 
            f = new File("public_signing_key"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            pub = new SignaturePublicKey(fis, 
 80 
                      SignatureParameters.TEST157); 
            fis.close(); 
            // Read private signing key from disk 
            f = new File("private_signing_key"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            pri = new SignaturePrivateKey(fis, 
                      SignatureParameters.TEST157); 
            fis.close(); 
            kp = new SignatureKeyPair(pri, pub); 
            // Read message from disk 
            f = new File("message"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            fis.read(buf); 
            fis.close(); 
            // Sign the message with the key pair 
            sig = ntru.sign(buf, kp); 
            // Write signature to disk 
            f = new File("signature"); 
            fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
            fos.write(sig); 
            fos.close(); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.err.println("Exception! " + e); 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
To compile and run this program, the user must have an 
existing public_signing_key and private_signing_key.  The 
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user creates a message file and then types the following 
commands: 
 
% javac -classpath ../../../.. Sign2.java 
% java -classpath ../../../.. net.sf.ntru.demo.Sign2 
 
Next, we created a program Verify.java to verify the 
signature.  This program requires the following files: 
















public class Verify { 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        verify(); 
    } 
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    private static void verify() { 
        // Create an instance of NtruSign. 
        NtruSign ntru = new NtruSign( 
                            SignatureParameters.TEST157);  
        byte[] buf = new byte[64]; 
        byte[] sig = new byte[1024]; 
        File f; 
        FileInputStream fis; 
        SignaturePrivateKey pri; 
        SignaturePublicKey pub; 
        try { 
            // Read the public signing key from disk 
            f = new File("public_signing_key"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            pub = new SignaturePublicKey(fis,  
                      SignatureParameters.TEST157); 
            fis.close(); 
            // Read the message from disk 
            f = new File("message"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            fis.read(buf); 
            fis.close(); 
            // Read the signature from disk 
            f = new File("signature"); 
            fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
            int nbytes = fis.read(sig); 
            fis.close(); 
            byte[] sig2 = new byte[nbytes]; 
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            for (int i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) 
                sig2[i] = sig[i]; 
            // Verify the signature 
            boolean valid = ntru.verify(buf, sig2, pub); 
            System.out.println("Valid? " + valid); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.err.println("Exception! " + e); 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
To compile and run this program, the user must have an 
existing public_signing_key, message, and signature.  The 
user types the following commands: 
 
% javac -classpath ../../../.. Verify.java 
% java -classpath ../../../.. net.sf.ntru.demo.Verify 
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VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. HASH-BASED CRYPTOLOGY 
After implementing the hash-based cryptography scheme 
in C, we evaluated it both on a Mac OS X system as well as 
in Ubuntu.  We established two Ubuntu Virtual Machine (VM) 
environments, one for the sender, and another for the 
receiver.  We validated the correct operation of the 
signature generation process in the sender’s environment, 
transferred the signature to the receiver’s environment, 
and validated the correct operation of the signature 
verification process in the receiver’s environment.  We 
then made a small change to the message to validate that 
the signature verification process failed. 
We also attempted to generate the signature on the Mac 
OS X system and verify the signature on the Ubuntu system.  
However, signature verification failed on the Ubuntu system 
because of a subtle implementation issue with the MD5 code 
we downloaded from Ronald Rivest’s website at MIT.  We 
discovered that this MD5 code produces a different hash 
value on the Mac than in the Ubuntu VM.  To fix this 
problem will require finding the source code of a 
cryptographic hash function that produces the same hash 
value for the same message on a Mac and in the Ubuntu 
environment. 
Currently, only messages with a maximum length of 256 
bytes are supported.  Future work will involve making a 
small change to the code to support messages of arbitrary  
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size.  This is a simple fix. The time required to sign a 
message consisting of 34 characters is less than one 
hundredth of a second. 
B. NTRUENCRYPT PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTO SYSTEM 
After implementing our modifications to the NTRU 
source code in Java, we evaluated the programs on both a 
Mac OS X system as well as in an Ubuntu VM environment.  We 
established two Ubuntu environments, one for the sender, 
and another for the receiver.  We validated the correct 
operation of the encryption program in the sender’s 
environment.  Then, we transferred the public_key, 
private_key, and ciphertext files to the receiver’s 
environment and validated the correct operation of the 
decryption program. 
Note that there are two encryption programs: one that 
generates a new encryption key pair and stores it to disk, 
and another that uses an existing encryption key pair, 
loading the public_key file from disk.  We validated the 
correct operation of both encryption programs. 
Also, we validated the correct operation of the 
signature generation process in the sender’s environment.  
Then, we transferred the public_signing_key, message, and 
signature to the receiver’s environment and validated the 
correct operation of the signature verification program. 
Note that there are two signature generation programs: 
one that generates a new signing key pair and stores it to 
disk, and another that uses an existing signing key pair, 
loading it from disk.  We validated the correct operation 
of both signature generation programs. 
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The time to encrypt a 37-byte message is less than one 
half of a second.  We are currently limited to messages 
with a maximum length of 64 characters.  A simple fix will 
allow messages of arbitrary length (below we describe a 
hybrid encryption scheme that already supports messages of 
any length).  The time to decrypt the message is less than 
0.3 seconds. 
The time to sign a 37-byte message is approximately 
one second.  We are currently limited to messages with a 
maximum length of 64 bytes.  A simple fix will allow 
messages of arbitrary length.  The time to verify the 
signature is approximately 0.3 seconds. 
C. OPENSSL 
Symmetric encryption is not vulnerable to quantum 
computers. To demonstrate how easy it is for anyone to use 
symmetric encryption, we show the following examples of 
using OpenSSL, which is installed on many systems, 
including Mac OS X and Ubuntu Linux. 
To encrypt a file plain.txt, all one must do is type 
the following at the command prompt: 
 
% openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt 
-K bead1234 -iv feed4321 
 
This will produce a file cipher.txt containing the 
ciphertext encrypted under key 0xbead1234 and 
initialization vector of 0xfeed4321 using the AES cipher 
with a key size of 128 bits and the cipher-block chaining 
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(CBC) mode of operation.  It takes less than one hundredth 
of a second to encipher a file containing 37 characters. 
To decrypt the file, the user types the following at 
the command prompt: 
 
% openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in cipher.txt -out 
decrypted.txt -K bead1234 -iv feed4321 
 
Deciphering the 37-character file also takes less than 
one hundredth of a second.  Note that the key and the 
initialization vector must be the same for encryption and 
decryption.  Otherwise, the file will not decrypt properly. 
Also, the output file decrypted.txt has a different 
filename than the original plaintext file plain.txt so that 
it is possible to compare the two rather than overwriting 
the original plaintext file.  When using a 128-bit key, the 
user may specify up to 128 hexadecimal digits of the key.  
In the above example, they key only has 8 hexadecimal 
digits, or 32 bits. 
D. NTRU + OPENSSL 
We now demonstrate a hybrid encryption protocol 
combining the quantum-resistant asymmetric cipher NTRU 
together with the quantum-resistant symmetric cipher AES 
implemented by OpenSSL. 
1) First, we generate a 128-bit key.  Suppose that 
this key is the hexadecimal value 
25c16a7af74b53d421754fadc0f1b531.  We create a text file 
plaintext containing these hexadecimal characters in ASCII 
format.  We place this file in the sender’s directory. Note 
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that you may also encrypt the initialization vector iv if 
you wish as a separate step. 
2) Next, we encrypt a file plain.txt containing the 
(long) message using AES as implemented by OpenSSL: 
 
% openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt 
-K 25c16a7af74b53d421754fadc0f1b531 -iv feed4321 
 
3) Next, we run the NTRU encryption program on the 
sender’s machine.  Either encryption program Encrypt.java 
or Encrypt2.java is acceptable depending on your 
requirements. 
 
% cd src/main/java/net/sf/ntru/demo 
% javac -classpath ../../../.. Encrypt.java 
% java -classpath ../../../.. net.sf.ntru.demo.Encrypt 
 
4) Next, we transfer the files public_key, private_key, 
ciphertext (the key encrypted with NTRU), and cipher.txt 
(the message encrypted with AES) to the receiver’s machine 
and run the NTRU decryption program on the receiver’s 
machine. 
 
% javac -classpath ../../../.. Decrypt.java 
% java -classpath ../../../.. net.sf.ntru.demo.Decrypt 
 
5) We note the hexadecimal characters printed to the 
screen as a result of the decryption operation and use them 
as the decryption key as follows: 
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% openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in cipher.txt -out 
decrypted.txt -K 25c16a7af74b53d421754fadc0f1b531 -iv 
feed4321 
 
6) The file decrypted.txt on the receiver’s machine 




VII. QUALITATIVE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Algorithms are Broken Eventually 
This thesis has covered how large-scale, fault-
tolerant quantum computers have the potential to render 
vulnerable algorithms like RSA, Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography, Diffie-Hellman, and others that use factoring 
of large numbers or computing discrete logarithms as the 
basis of their security.  In general, ciphers are 
eventually broken over time, as shown by the trend for hash 
algorithms depicted in Figure 11.  The growth of computing 
power as described by Moore's Law, new ways of harnessing 
computing power like daisy-chaining the processing power of 
multiple XBOX 360s, or new breakthroughs in mathematics all 
contribute to rendering vulnerable (i.e., breaking) 




Figure 11.   Life cycles of popular cryptographic hashes 
(From:http://valerieaurora.org/monkey.html) 
It is the continuous life-cycle of algorithms being 
invented and broken that motivates the field of cryptology 
to continuously invent new algorithms that are hardened 
through peer-review.  In security and cryptography, there 
are no silver-bullets today or in a quantum-computing era, 
and a defense-in-depth approach ranging from cipher design 
to cryptosystem implementation is essential whenever 
sensitive information is stored or distributed via an 
electronic medium. 
2. Protection of the CIA Triad in a Quantum Era  
For those who choose to store and transfer sensitive 
information via electronic means to have a complete system 
that protects our data with respect to all facets of the 
CIA Triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) in 
a quantum-computing era, we must replace algorithms 
believed to be vulnerable with those believed to be quantum 
computing resistant to prepare for the emergence of large-
scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers.  Therefore, we 
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must have an algorithm to create digital fingerprints of 
our messages, and it is essential for our system to have a 
secret-key algorithm to encrypt and decrypt the bulk of our 
secure communication.  We also need to be able to digitally 
sign our messages as we would hard-copy messages.  Finally, 
we require a secure method of distributing symmetric 
session keys. 
B. ASSESSMENT OF OUR QUANTUM COMPUTING READINESS 
1. Introduction 
The following figure depicts the authors’ assessment 
of the world's quantum computing readiness. 
 
Figure 12.   Quantum Computing Readiness 
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2. Digital Signatures 
Modern cryptographic hash functions provide one method 
for creating digital signatures.  Since a hash function 
must accept a variable-size input, output a fixed-length 
digest, be fast to compute, difficult to invert, and 
produce few collisions, these requirements of a secure hash 
algorithm also make hash functions quantum-resistant.  
Therefore, we are already capable of producing digital 
signatures for a quantum-computing era, and that is why the 
block is labeled green for digital fingerprints under 
Cryptographic Hash-Functions. 
3. Symmetric (Secret-Key) Cryptology 
Another algorithm already in wide use that will be 
quantum-resistant is the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES).  This symmetric algorithm is cleared to protect the 
United States Government's most sensitive material when 
using AES key sizes of 192 bits or greater.  There will be 
no change required to the symmetric cryptography system 
when quantum computers come into existence, and this is why 
the block is labeled green for symmetric cryptography under 
AES. The NTRUEncrypt and Kerberos columns are also labeled 
green for symmetric cryptography because both systems 
support the AES algorithm as part of their secret-key 
algorithm. 
4. Digital Signatures 
One viable and efficient system we have available 
today for creating digital signatures in a quantum-
computing era is the NTRUEncrypt Cryptosystem.  This block 
is labeled yellow because even though NTRU Encrypt is 
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capable of creating digital signatures and is even more 
efficient at digital signatures than algorithms currently 
in wide use, NTRU is not widely accepted yet, and RSA 
reigns as the most common algorithm used for digital 
signatures. 
5. Session-Key Distribution 
NTRUEncrypt and Kerberos both provide secure methods 
for session key distribution, but they are labeled yellow 
in the figure for two separate reasons.  First, NTRU is 
able to distribute session keys in a public-key 
infrastructure just like the popular RSA algorithm does 
today.  As discussed above, NTRUEncrypt is more efficient 
than RSA.  The reason why NTRU is shown in the figure in 
yellow for session-key distribution is for the same reason 
provided for digital signatures: NTRUEncrypt is not yet 
widely accepted and has not been added to the list of 
possible public-key algorithms for many RFC standards as an 
alternative algorithm for public-key cryptography. 
On the other hand, Kerberos could be considered widely 
accepted because Microsoft has been using Kerberos since 
Microsoft Server 2000, and with the latest version, 
Kerberos is an extremely secure system that assumes the 
network it operates in is untrusted and requires user 
authentication whenever the user is trying to perform any 
function outside of his or her workstation.  The drawback 
to Kerberos, and the reason that it is labeled yellow in 
the figure, is that Kerberos authentication is recursive in 
nature.  All users must be authenticated with a single 
server prior to being provided access to the ticket 
granting server, which then provides the user subsequent 
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access to other services like file and print servers.  This 
authentication system would be fine for a closed and 
trusted intranet like multiple University intranets 
connected to one another, but this single point of 
authentication, and the fact that every user must 
physically register with a Kerberos server prior to logging 
onto a Kerberos network, makes a Kerberos system unsuitable 
for Internet scalability. 
C. SCENARIO-BASED PREPARATION; IF QUANTUM COMPUTERS WERE 
INVENTED 
1. Tomorrow 
Yogi Berra once said that prediction is difficult, 
especially about the future.  This statement is applicable 
to quantum computing: it is difficult to know when or if 
large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers will become 
available.  Nevertheless, this section offers some 
speculation, a glimpse into the future, with educated 
guesses based on the analysis presented in this thesis.  If 
quantum computers suddenly become available to attackers, 
no one may know this fact until after an attack has already 
occurred.  Attackers/adversaries could be terrorist 
organizations or governments with the ability to fund the 
development of quantum computers.  A successful program to 
develop a quantum computer would likely want to keep its 
success a secret in order to maximize the amount of 
eavesdropping.  Disclosure of the successful development 
would weaken the effectiveness of the tool since 
countermeasures would likely be put into place upon 
disclosure. 
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Assuming that quantum computers have not been 
invented, and that the inventor(s) of the large-scale, 
fault-tolerant quantum computer would benefit (e.g., 
financially or in terms of status) from publicizing the 
invention of a quantum computer immediately, then there 
would be a large push for the rapid implementation of 
alternative public-key cryptosystems to replace the popular 
RSA algorithm.  It is likely that leading Internet browser 
companies would work around the clock until their browsers 
supported the quantum-resistant alternatives, and most 
browsers would be able to support the alternatives in a 
short period of time.  A large-scale boycott of the 
Internet is unlikely because most users are ignorant of 
basic computer security.  The hasty implementation of 
changes could itself result in bugs, which would need to be 
addressed by software patches.  While software changes can 
be made relatively easily (e.g., by downloading a patch), 
changes to hardware are more expensive.  For example, ASIC 
implementations of cryptosystems would need to be 
redesigned and fabricated, which is extremely expensive and 
time-consuming.  Programmable hardware (e.g., field-
programmable gate arrays, or FPGAs) can be more easily 
updated with new cryptographic hardware designs, but 
engineering of the new designs must take place whether ASIC 
or FPGA is used. 
Enumerating the various cryptosystems that use 
special-purpose hardware is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but in general, organizations that use custom, 
dedicated hardware to implement cryptography do so in order 
to keep up with large volumes of data, i.e., high 
bandwidth/throughput.  A company that uses custom, 
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dedicated hardware could either switch over to a software 
implementation temporarily as a coping mechanism and later 
to FPGA and finally to ASIC.  A company that is already 
using FPGAs could reprogram the FPGAs with the new custom 
design when it is available.  In the worst case, unless 
that company feels that costs of shutting the system down 
is more costly than keeping the system up and running in a 
potentially unsecure environment, all aspects of operation 
that depend on that piece of hardware will be down until a 
company can replace it.  Even after replacement hardware is 
fabricated, the laws of supply and demand will cause prices 
to skyrocket, and the organizations that have the most 
money will pay top dollar to receive the first available 
replacement products, while other smaller companies would 
have to wait. 
If quantum computers suddenly become available, this 
could have a serious impact on some organizations.  
Fortunately, a large institution like the Accredited 
Standards Committee X9 Incorporated, Financial Industry 
Standards, has taken heed to the warnings of quantum 
computers, has noted the efficiency of the NTRUEncrypt 
Public-Key Cryptosystem, and has already made the 
transition to NTRU from RSA.  Therefore, it is encouraging 
to see steps being taken in a positive direction, but these 
are not enough.  Even though our financial institutions are 
able to communicate securely among themselves using 
alternatives such as NTRU, ordinary users are unable to 
communicate securely with our financial institutions using 
alternatives such as NTRU. Therefore, our sensitive  
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financial data will be vulnerable in a quantum-computing 
era during transit between our Internet browsers and our 
banks' web servers unless changes are implemented. 
2. A Year from Today 
If quantum computers become available a year from 
today, we have time to manage the change without causing 
too much chaos for those organization that are predicted to 
be impacted the most.  IT organizations that publish 
software and/or hardware implementations that perform 
digital signatures or support public-key infrastructures 
could begin the transition tomorrow.  The software aspect 
of this problem can likely be remedied the fastest because 
the Internet can be used to publish the updates and patches 
as required.  The hardware aspect of this problem is likely 
to require the most time since after a prototype has been 
created and tested, manufacturing plants must produce the 
new hardware.  After the hardware has begun mass 
production, it must be shipped to the customer via means 
that are typically no faster than 24 hours.  Then, once the 
product has arrived, it must be installed and tested. 
Assuming installation occurs with zero problems (one could 
easily argue that this assumption is unrealistic) 
installation of the hardware implementation takes longer 
than a software implementation, in general. 
It is worthwhile to consider the question, "are IT 
companies at least working towards adding alternatives such 
as NTRUEncrypt to the list of possible implementations?"  
If not, we will more likely find ourselves in the first 
scenario, where quantum computers come into existence 
tomorrow, and we are totally unprepared for their arrival. 
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3. Beyond a Year, but Sometime in the Near Future 
If quantum computers become available more than a year 
from now, but sometime in the near future, we could 
potentially benefit from all of the remedies described in 
the section where quantum computers were invented a year 
from today and more.  In fact, this scenario would look 
very similar to the Y2K problem the world faced in the 
1990s, the main difference being that the world knew that 
by 01/01/01, all systems must be made Y2K-compliant.  
Unfortunately, the quantum computing cryptology management 
problem does not know exactly when someone will invent 
fault-tolerant quantum computers.  Assuming we have 
multiple years to prepare for the quantum-computing era 
(i.e., the quantum singularity), we could use methodologies 
learned from Y2K to transition into a quantum-computing 
era, such as the publishing of best practices.  With the 
Accredited Standards Committee X9 Incorporated, Financial 
Industry Standards, being one of the first if not the first 
large industry to change over to alternatives such as NTRU, 
they could publish their lessons learned for others to 
follow.  Organizations could designate a Quantum Computer 
Transition Coordinator who is a senior IT manager to assess 
the organization's vulnerability to quantum computers and 
the impact they will have, identify the optimal solution, 
and then take the time to refine the solution while 
providing scheduled updates to the senior executives. 
Even the companies that have critical hardware 
implementations of algorithms that are predicted to be 
vulnerable to quantum computing could start soliciting IT 
hardware companies to fabricate an alternative.  If 
 101 
predictions indicated the lack of an available alternative 
hardware implementation within a year, the organization 
could consider installing a software backup running on more 
machines, or even leverage field-programmable gate-arrays 
(FPGAs) that are the hybrid of software and hardware 
implementations.  FPGAs are faster than software for 
certain high-throughput applications, but they are not 
dedicated hardware and therefore are not as fast as pure 
hardware implementations (e.g., Application-Specific 
Integrated Circuits, or ASICs).  Another benefit of FPGAs 
is that they are reprogrammable like software 
implementations, whereas dedicated hardware requires 
complete replacement, and this is more costly than updating 
software or FPGA implementations. 
In conclusion, if we have a few years to manage the 
cryptography transition from RSA to NTRU, there would be 
minimal to no rush in the transition; we could learn from 
published best-practices or lessons-learned of how to best 
manage the transition; organizations could make full 
assessments of the vulnerabilities and what courses of 
action are best to take for each vulnerability; and 
finally, new systems could be tested while still having the 
strong and popular RSA algorithm on standby just in case 
the organization had a problem with the new system.  Once 
quantum computers come into existence, RSA will not be 
available to use as training wheels. 
D. ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
This thesis recommends that the rest of the industry 
follow the lead of the Accredited Standards Committee X9 
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Incorporated, Financial Industry Standards, and identify a 
suitable alternative cipher such as the NTRUEncrypt 
Cryptosystem as the primary algorithm for asymmetric 
cryptography to replace RSA if needed.  Preparations should 
be made to facilitate a smooth transition if it becomes 
necessary.  If the concern is too great that NTRU is a new 
algorithm, then this thesis at least recommends that it be 
added to the published standards as an alternative cipher 
implementation so that it is available to the industry in 




A. HYPOTHESIS QUESTIONS REVIEWED 
What if quantum computing reduces the time to defeat 
traditional ciphers from millions of years by today’s 
supercomputers to only seconds? What if we are already 
living in that era, and unfriendly forces have such 
technology? 
How efficient are post-quantum ciphers proposed as 
alternatives to traditional ciphers like RSA and Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC)?  Do these ciphers have enough 
bandwidth to meet today's cryptographic workloads?  What is 
the performance impact of deploying an alternative 
cryptographic infrastructure based on post-quantum ciphers?  
Could available implementations be used as a basis for 
constructing a cryptographic software library that is a 
viable alternative to classical ciphers? 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
While alternative ciphers exist, available 
implementations do not satisfy all performance requirements 
of modern cryptographic workloads.  A cryptographic 
infrastructure that allows for ciphers to be reconfigured 
dynamically will reduce the costs of switching 
cryptographic infrastructure quickly in response to the 
development of quantum computers. 
C. HYPOTHESIS VALIDATION 
This research validates the hypothesis that 
alternative ciphers exist, and implementations of some 
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quantum-resistant ciphers are available.  This research 
validated the feasibility of developing an original 
implementation of a quantum-resistant cipher, specifically 
hash-based digital signature, based on a description of the 
algorithm in the post-quantum cryptography literature. This 
implementation was used to send a digitally signed message 
from the sender’s machine to the receiver’s machine, where 
the signed message was verified successfully.  This thesis 
also validated the feasibility of adapting and customizing 
existing implementations of quantum-resistant ciphers, 
showing how to modify the source code of the NTRU 
cryptosystem to send an encrypted message from the sender’s 
machine to the receiver’s machine, where it was 
successfully decrypted.  This thesis also showed how to 
modify the source code of NTRU to send a digitally signed 
message from the sender’s machine to the receiver’s 
machine, where it was successfully verified.  This thesis 
also showed how to use NTRU and AES together as part of a 
hybrid encryption protocol.  Specifically, NTRU was used as 
a quantum-resistant asymmetric cipher to exchange a 
symmetric session key.  The quantum-resistant symmetric 
cipher AES, implemented by OpenSSL, was used to encrypt a 
long message.  Future work is needed to ensure that 
implementations of quantum-resistant ciphers are free of 
implementation flaws and that the ciphers themselves (i.e., 
the algorithms) have been exposed to rigorous peer review 
to ensure that the algorithms are mathematically sound and 
provably secure.  
The research shows that the phrase of the hypothesis 
that states “available implementations do not satisfy all 
performance requirements of modern cryptographic workloads” 
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is partially incorrect, at least with respect to one 
implementation of lattice-based cryptography.  
Specifically, existing studies of the NTRUEncrypt Public-
Key Crypto System have demonstrated that NTRU outperforms 
RSA, today’s leading public-key algorithm.  According to 
the published literature, since NTRU is a new system, it 
has not yet gained industry acceptance. 
Qualitative analysis shows the usefulness of a 
flexible, configurable design approach to cryptosystems and 
large-scale cryptographic infrastructure.  Future work is 
needed to measure the costs of developing and deploying an 
alternative infrastructure that is more configurable than 
the existing infrastructure.  While such an effort would be 
extremely costly, so too would be the impact of the sudden 
emergence of large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers 
requiring the shutting down of critical systems until 
software patches and even expensive and time-consuming 
hardware changes are completed.  The decision to use 
infrastructure that allows for ciphers to be reconfigured 
dynamically involves performance considerations and 
tradeoffs.  For example, a software implementation is more 
general, flexible, and configurable than a custom hardware 
like Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) 
implementation, but this generality often comes at the cost 
of performance for high-throughput workloads.  On the other 
hand, while an ASIC may provide higher throughput for 
certain high-bandwidth cryptographic workloads in 
comparison with software implementations, ASICs are 
expensive to design and manufacture, and they are difficult 
to quickly replace should a cipher be broken.  Future work 
is needed to compare the tradeoffs of CPU/software, FPGA, 
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and ASIC implementations of cryptosystems for use in a 
cryptographic infrastructure that is adaptable to the 
possibility of a sudden shift to a quantum-computing era. 
D. MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends that industry follow the lead 
of the Accredited Standards Committee X9 Incorporated, 
Financial Industry Standards, and identify a suitable 
alternative cipher such as the NTRUEncrypt Cryptosystem as 
the primary algorithm for asymmetric cryptography to 
replace RSA if needed.  Preparations should be made to 
facilitate a smooth transition if it becomes necessary.  If 
the concern is too great that NTRU is a new algorithm, then 
this thesis at least recommends that it be added to the 
published standards as an alternative cipher implementation 
so that it is available to the industry in the event 
quantum computers abruptly come into existence. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS EXPLAINED 
The author recommends the continued development of 
quantum-resistant ciphers and the refinement of existing 
quantum-resistant ciphers such as the NTRUEncrypt Public-
Key Cryptosystem as alternatives to traditional public-key 
algorithms.  Peer review is essential to ensure that the 
ciphers are mathematically sound and that their 
implementations are free of exploitable implementation 
flaws.  Once quantum computers are realized, we will no 
longer have RSA to fall back upon in the event we find NTRU 
is not mathematically sound or has exploitable 
implementation flaws. 
 107 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
With published studies showing that the NTRUEncrypt 
Public-Key Crypto System is more efficient than RSA, future 
work is needed to consider how NTRU would compare to 
Kerberos, a system that is solely based on symmetric 
cryptography, which is also quantum-resistant. 
Further testing of implementations of post-quantum 
ciphers such as the NTRUEncrypt Public-Key Cryptosystem is 
recommended to validate the implementation.  Peer review of 
the algorithm itself should continue to ensure the security 
of the cipher. 
Research on the use of Field Program Gate Arrays 
(FPGAs) as part of a strategy to provide a reconfigurable 
cryptographic infrastructure that is adaptable to the 
sudden emergence of a quantum-computing era is needed.  
Such research should explore the performance and cost 
tradeoffs with respect to software/CPU and custom ASIC 
implementations.  An adaptable infrastructure is one that 
can easily transition from using ciphers that are 
vulnerable to quantum computers to using those ciphers that 
are quantum-resistant instead.  
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